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Abstract 
The following thesis examines the reception of the 
economic policies of Sir Robert Peel in and around 
Tyneside between 1841 and 1846. The aim of the study is 
to assess local reaction in a major industrial area to 
the economic measures of a national government and to 
assess how this equates with received views and those of 
contemporary commentators. Selected aspects of the 
economy of the north-east are examined in order to 
establish the regional economic and political backgrouQd 
to the study and the aims and methods of Peel's economic 
strategy are briefly outlined. The core of the thesis 
follows the reaction within the press on Tyneside to Peel's 
economic measures - the budgets of 1842 and 1845, the 
Bank Charter Act of 1844 and the repeal of the Corn Laws 
(1846). An attempt is also made to continue the study 
into 1847, a year when Peel's policies were again the 
subject of public debate during major financial crises and 
a general election. Supplementary sources - contemporary 
memoirs, the Times, the records of the meetings of 
various interest groups (coal, shipping, farmers and 
landowners), parliamentary and election statements - help 
to augment the public reaction as portrayed in the press. 
The basic conclusion reached is that press reaction on 
Tyneside was above all parochial for editors saw the 
measures in north-east terms and were less concerned 
about the national impact. This press reaction was also 
conditioned significantly by the political stance of 
iii. 
the paper. North-eastern M.P's. reacted in a broadly 
similar fashion to the press representing the local 
concerns of their constituents although responding more 
to their political ties. 
iv. 
Preface 
"Among the mercantile manufacturing and professional 
classes of the north ... the reputation he had made with 
the corn law and the budget of 1842 had been crowned by 
1 the repeal of the corn laws". 
So writes Norman Gash when describing the reception 
of Peel's economic policies in the north during the 
administration of 1841-1846. Professor Gash tells us 
elsewhere that Peel's main desire was to "reunite the 
country" 2 and that his policies were neither "sectional. 
nor partisan" 3 and that he set out to close the class 
divisions which existed in the country. It is the aim 
of this thesis to examine the reception of the economic 
policies of the conservative administration in the North 
East of England, and the extent to which they are compatible 
with the views expressed by Professor Gash; in other words, 
did the North East respond so enthusiastically to Peel's 
economic package as recent studies suggest? 
The North East was a major economic region with well-
established industries along the Tyne and Wear by the 
middle of the 19th century. 4 Commerce with the Baltic, 
Western Europe and North America was brisk and Peel's 
tariff proposals would of course have major implications 
for those interests connected with shipping. The first 
half of the 19th Century saw a vast expansion in the coal 
industry and the fiscal potential of its export was 
readily appreciated by the Prime Minister. In spite of 
the rapidly developing industrial base (and to some 
extent because of it), the aristocracy retained much of 
v. 
their traditional power which is reflected in the reaction 
of the region to the economic policies of the national 
government. 
Much of the research which follows is based upon an 
examination and study of the Tyneside press between 1840 
and 1847 in an attempt to assess the reaction of the region 
to Peel's economic legislation. The full political spectrum 
is represented by four papers - The Journal which was 
solidly Tory; the Newcastle Chronicle which was Liberal and 
5 the Tyne Mercury and Gateshead Observer which represented 
Radical Opinion. These obviously had to represent, reflect 
the views of, and satisfy those sections of the public 
which read them regularly. Constituency opinion should be 
. e ' revealed to a certain extent 1n the state~ts of M.P s. who 
would have to attempt to satisfy their constituents' wishes 
and interests. Contemporary opinion outside the region is 
provided by an examination of the Times and the diaries of 
political commentators close to the political arena in 
London. The records of the United Committee of the Coal 
Trade and press coverage of the meetings of the Newcastle 
City Council, Chamber of Commerce, the Agricultural 
Protection Societies of Northumberland and Durham and the 
Shipowners of Tyneside provide some insight into the 
reaction of separate interests groups in the region. 
I would like to thank the staff of the Central Library 
Newcastle, the Newcastle University Library and the 
Gateshead Public Library for their co-operation and 
friendly assistance and also all those who have taken 
time and trouble on my behalf. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Economic and Political Setting: 
Selected Aspects of the Economy of the 
North-East 
In 1800 Northumberland and Durham were basically 
rural counties in which the coal industry intruded along 
the margins of the rivers Tyne and Wear and to some 
extent along the coast. There were other industries, 
but they were of limited scale; saltworks along the Tyne., 
glass and pottery, engineering at Hawks, Crawsley and 
Crowleys. By 1850, it is generally agreed that all this 
had changed. More than half of the population were 
living in urban communities. 1 Agriculture was the major 
activity in 1750: by 1851 the relative importance of 
agriculture and coalmining had changed; the census of 
that year reveals that 41,000 were employed in coalmining 
and 35,000 in farming. The vast expansion in the 
exploitation of the Durham Coalfield helps to explain 
this change. In fact, one authority has concluded that: 
"By 1850, what had previously been a society of 
small, scattered largely agricultural communities 
was already advanced in the transformation into 
an industrialised and urban society".2 
Certain qualifications should be made to this picture. 
Firstly, urban growth in the North East was largely 
ribbon development along the rivers rather than 
nucleated conurbations and, consequently, these areas 
were not detached from their rural surroundings, unlike 
such areas as Manchester and Birmingham. Secondly, the 
1851 census shows that farming was still the largest 
occupational group in Northumberland. Lastly, ·the decline 
of older industries (such as lead mining), and the 
attraction of industrial wages, led to other areas of 
population decline, especially parts of Northumberland, 
1 . 
the western belt of the Tweed and Tees Valleys, and in 
the cld lead mining areas. 
The growth of Bedlingtonshire in South East 
Northumberland may, perhaps, be taken as an example of 
the impact of industrial development, especially 
coalmining, within the region as a whole. In 1801, the 
population was only 1422. By 1841, this had swollen to 
3,155 and within another decade the figure had reached 
3 5,000. Two major factors may account for this massive 
growth. Firstly, the period 1819 to 1853 saw dramatic 
expansion and development of the Bedlington Ironworks 
under the successful entrepreneur Michael Langridge. By 
1850, the works was employing over 2,000 4 workers and 
had grown from a small scale operation producing nails 
and anchors to an impressive complex with a European 
reputation producing rails, rolling stock, and locomotives. 5 
Contemporary views of the works reveal that this development 
nevertheless took place within a basically rural setting. 6 
The second major factor was quite clearly the increasing 
exploitation of the coal reserves of the Shire. In 1838 
the Bedlington Coal Company was formed with Langridge as 
one of the partners. Their first pit was sunk three years 
later at Sleekburn and coal was being shipped out from 
the river Blyth via the S.S. Bedlington. 7 The major 
development of coal mining came in the 1850's. The 
I , 
construction of a railway over the Blyth in 1850 enabled 
the development of coal seams north of the river to take 
place and the Bedlington Coal Company was able to open 
three new pits in the area and transpcrt the coal directly 
2. 
to the Tyne for shipment to London and Europe. The 
census for 1861 illustrates in more detail the demographic 
impact of coalmining upor this area (see below p.3). 
The increase of population within Bedlingtonshire 
reflects the dramatic increase throughout the region in 
the first half of the 19th century. In 1801 the population 
of County Durham was 168,000; that of Northumberland 
149,0CO. This accountec for 3.5% of the total pcpulation 
of England and Wales. By 1851 the population of the 
region had more than doubled - Northumberland contained 
304,000, Durham 391,000, which represented 3.80% of the 
national total, and an overall annual gro~th rate within 
the two counties of 1.4% for the period 1801-1830 ccmpared 
with a growth rate of 0.4% for the period 1781-1800. 8 
Although migration does play a part, in general, the two 
counties seem to have met their own labour demands from 
the natural· increase of generations born within the 
region. Long distance migration is a less significant 
feature of growth than internal migration across county 
borders from one area of the north east to another, from 
older to newly established pits, from countryside to 
urban areas and especially from west to east Durham. 
While the 1851 census of County Durham revealed an 
apparently high percentage of migrant labour - 31% of 
the county's population were born outside the county -
the majority of these migrants came from short distance 
migration from neighbouring counties. Admittedly Ireland 
(perhaps because of the presence of Lord Londonderry as 
3 . 
a major, as well as Irish, landowner) provided 18,000 
of the county's total population of 391,000, but Scotland 
only 2,800, and the southern counties of England including 
London only 3,000. By contrast, Northumberland and 
Yorkshire each contributed 40,000 (perhaps attracted by 
the opening of the East Durham coalfield), with 
Cumberland and Westmoreland a further 7,500. 9 
Irish and Scottish workers played their part in the 
industrial development of the region especially during 
periods of adversity within their homelands. During 
periods of food scarcity and harvest time there was a 
seasonal influx. The pull of the industrial development 
of the 'region and the impact of the famine led to more 
permanent settlement. The Irish community of Newcastle 
numbered 2,800 in 1841 (5.7% of Newcastle's population) 
and this had grown to 7,100 in 1851(7.9% of the City's 
. 10 population). In Bedlington, the 1861 census shows a 
significant number of Irish workers listed as miners and 
this may well reflect the expansion of the activities of 
the Bedlington Coal Company in the North of the Shire in 
the 1850's. A small Irish enclave was developing in the 
High Street in Bedlington. One estimate of the total 
·Irish population for Newcastle and Co. Durham in 1841 is 
9,000 and this may have grown to 30,000 by 1851. 11 
Limited transport facilities and restricted press 
circulation would obviously hinder recruitment to the 
growth industries from outside the region. Irish 
'blackleg' labour was imported by Lord Londonderry from 
4. 
his Irish estates to work his pits during the strike of 
1844 - but most of these had left by 1845 having helped 
to keep Londonderry's pits open. 12 The impact of Cornish 
blackleg labour on the region's industrial development 
was ever more limited. Of 32 brought to Radcliffe 
Colliery in 1844, all but four had run away within the 
month! 13 
How did this growth in population affect 
distribution? Industrial developments obviously play a 
major part in the concentration of population. Coal 
mining was the dominant factor controlling population 
distribution in Co. Durham. The greater part of the 
Great Northern Coalfield lay within Durham and the 
development of railways, technological advances and the 
consequent penetration of the magnesian limestone belt 
led to the opening up of new coalfields and the growth 
of new communities in areas previously unmined in Durham 
i.e. the upper Wear and Tees Valleys. The 'spin-off' 
from the coal industry helped to develop established 
industrial areas in Tyneside. By the early 1850's, 
Jarrow had 3,000 employed in shipbuilding, Stephenson's 
Engineering Works employed 1,000 and Hawthorn's 700. 
This industrial expansion explains the rapid growth of 
·Tyneside. In 1801, the combined total of North and South 
Tyneside was 93,000: by 1851 this had swollen to 222,000. 14 
In spite of this dramatic shift in the proportion 
of those employed in coalmining as opposed to farming 
(see p.l. above), agriculture was still the dominant 
5. 
6. 
activity for those north of the Tyne even in 1850. 
Northumberland had in fact acquired a reputation as an 
area of improved farming. This reputation rested upon 
the work of a few well known innovators - the Culley 
Brothers and John Grey of Dilston - and improved farming 
was to be found in a few selected areas - North 
Northumberland and the Tyne Valley. Much of the 
county, especially in the west, however, was poorly 
farmed and there was little evidence of extensive 
drainage schemes or improved farming practices. Even in 
the more productive eastern areas many farmers persevered 
with traditional techniques. Several factors may help 
to explain why this county had gained this reputation. 
The granting of long leases in those areas where 
improvements were most visible may have encouraged 
tenants to use experimental techniques secure in the 
knowledge that they would reap'the profits of their 
investment in time and money. Again, technical innovation 
was desirable in an area of scattered population and high 
agricultural wages. Lastly, land was still the basis of 
social influence and a successful farmer and land owner 
would receive much contemporary praise and financial 
d f 0 l l 0 0 15 rewar rom agr1cu tura 1nnovat1on. Successful 
families recognised the political and social prestige 
provided by land ownership an?, therefore, attempted to 
establish themselves as important landowners. The Ridley 
family, which for many generations had prospered as 
successful Newcastle merchants, acquired much land in 
South East Northumberland in the late 18th century but 
continued to develop the family fortunes through a number 
of activities - banking, coalmining, harbour developments 
in Blyth and the successful agricultural exploitation of 
their estates. The dividing line between industry and 
farming was in fact very thin. Contacts between the two 
were very strong. Skills were transferable - the blacksmith 
was easily employed in the iron works. Henry Morton the 
land agent for the Lambton family from the 1820's till 
1870, came to develop the agricultural potential of his 
master's estates, but soon acquired the necessary 
knowledge to exploit the mineral resources below them. 16 
'King Coal' obviously played the leading role in the 
rapid economic development of the region. It became the 
premier industrial activity of the region for there was 
a large market in London, a small export trade and steady 
demand from local industries (salt, glass, iron smelting_ 
etc). The stimulus to demand led to technical improvements 
which allowed the sinking of deeper pits and the transport 
of coal in large quantities especially by rail and wagon. 
The opening of the south and east Durham coalfields 
compensated for the exhaustion of the high main seam in 
Tyneside in the 1830's. Capital investment was now a 
major problem for the financial return from a new sinking 
might take many years. Investment on such a scale was 
often beyond the resources of the local landowner however 
exalted his position. Therefore, many landowners preferred 
to lease coal royalties rather than engage in large scale 
7. 
operations. Although, the Marquesses of Londonderry 
persisted in working their own undertakings into the 
twentieth century, the county's other major private 
coalowner, Lord Durham, went over to leasehold 
17 
management, while the Church in Durham, probably the 
largest owner of coal in the north, had long preferred to 
18 lease its properties for exploitation by others. Such 
developments explain the dramatic increase in production 
from the Great Northern Coalfield within the first half 
of the 19th century: 4.5m tons in 1800 to 10.5m tons in 
1850. The numbers employed increased by some threefold -
12,000 in 1800 to 40,000 in 1850. The number of pits more 
than doubled in the period 1830-1844. Shipments of coal 
from the Tyne increased significantly - 2.2m tons in 1831 
to 4m tons in the 1850's. Coal exports also showed a 
remarkable increase: 161,000 tons were exported in 1831 
and this figure rose to 1m tons by 1845. 19 
The massive increase in output and shipment brought 
with it problems as well as profits for the landowners 
especially those who owned the leading concerns. In order 
to prevent a glut and the consequent collapse of prices in 
the London Market, an attempt was made by the colliery 
owners of the Tyne and Wear to regulate production by 
the imposition of quotas for each area and individual 
collieries. This 'Regulation of the Vend' operated with 
varying degrees of success during the first half of the 
19th century. As the number of collieries increased in 
the 1830's and the 1840's it proved increasingly difficult 
8. 
for the three major concerns on the Wear - Hetton, Lambton, 
Londonderry- to maintain their share of the 'Vend'. In 
fact, the history of the association was punctuated by 
periods of open trade amongst the members as individuals 
determined to place self interest before the common bond. 20 
The mid-1840's witnessed such a collapse amidst other 
problems for the coal industry as a whole. Peel's 
decision to restore the export duty on coal in 1842 
intensified competition on the home market. The growth of 
the railway network threatened the North East monopoly of 
the London Market. The consequent slump with sales of coal 
down by 65,000 tons over the year 1842-43 determined 
employers to resist the demands of the miners' association 
to restore wages and ushered in the bitter strike of 1844 
in Northumberland and Durham. 21 Lord Londonderry perceived 
the inability of the owners to operate the Regulation 
successfully during this period of change and took 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the strike to 
satisfy demand as it rose in the capital. 22 In spite of 
these problems, the coal industry proved to be the leading 
sector in the industrial transformation of the region 
and growth in this area necessitated growth and expansion 
in other areas - shipping, engineering, improved port 
facilities, iron working and a sophisticated banking and 
commercial structure to facilitate this industrial boom. 
Shipbuilding and shipping constituted the second 
area of industrial activity in the region. A feature of 
the Tyne yards was their limited size. By 1848 there 
9. 
10. 
were only 36 yards on the Tyne. The real centre of ship-
building in the country was Sunderland and this one town 
was producing·on average 50,000 tons a year in the 1850's. 
The Wear offered far better port facilities than the Tyne. 
Sunderland had appointed Improvement Commissioners in 1717 
and these officials had been most active in harbour 
improvement. By comparison, the City of Newcastle 
controlled the whole of the Tyne and,in spite of protests 
from the growing towns of Gateshead, Tynemouth, North and 
South Shields, little was done until the 1850's when control 
of the port passed to the Tyne Improvement Commission. 
Significant improvements to the harbour in Blyth were 
only made in the 1850's. The prospectus for the Blyth 
Harbour Docks and Railway Company issued in 1853 illustrates 
the potential of coal shipments from such a harbour and 
the commercial disaster if railways tapped the newly 
d . . h h f dl. h. 23 opene p1ts 1n t e nort o Be 1ngtons 1re. The Ridley's 
had uncharacteristically neglected the potential of Blyth 
Port in the second quarter of the 19th century. All that 
was to change in the second half of the century: harbour 
improvements, dock construction, channel excavation arid 
a branch line from the Blyth and Tyne Railway would help 
to lay the foundation of Blyth's industrial development 
through to the next century. The growth of the coal 
trade to London and abroad was obviously a major 
incentive to shipbuilding. Before the various improvements 
made to the rivers, Keelmen were in great demand to take 
the coal to colliers waiting outside the river mouths. 
Increasing competition from railway development and 
maritime improvements brought much hardship for those 
workers. Nevertheless their trade continued well into 
the second half of the 19th century and there is evidence 
that some new collieries preferred to use Keelmen rather 
than bear the escalating costs of railway construction 
24 
and transport. Sea-borne coal accounted for no less 
than 86% of the total volume of Tyneside trade in 1859. 
In return, ships brought other materials in the form of 
ballast-clay from Devon and Cornwall, salt from Cheshire, 
chalk and limestone from the Thames and French ports. 
These materials assisted the growth of other industries, 
in particular the chemical industry. Alkalis were shipped 
from the Tyne and such shipments were second only to coal 
in the mid 19th century. 25 
Politically the north east represented a broad 
division between Northumberland, which remained something 
of a Tory stronghold and County Durham which gave solid 
support to the Whigs. In fact, one authority has gone 
further and labelled the north east as the "very citadel 
of liberalism". 26 Statistics lend some weight to this 
description. Of the 13 seats in Durham and Tyneside 
after 1832 the 'liberals' never held less than nine 
throughout the century and Durham resisted the Tory 
revival of 1841. No district outside London remained so 
loyal to the Liberals during a period of changes to the 
electorate and the politically influential elites. The 
11. 
new seats that appeared in 1832, reflected the growing 
population and new interests. There were two additional 
27 
members for County Durham, two new borough M.P's. for 
Sunderland and representation was now granted to 
Gateshead, Tynemouth and South Shields. Tory hopes were 
pinned on Newcastle (where there were strong traditional 
Tory influences - corporation, coal, shipping) and 
Durham city (where the constituency boundary favoured 
Londonderry's interest although excluding his freemen who 
worked at Seaham Harbour). There was also a slim chance 
of gaining one seat in North Durham. Whig hopes rested on 
the newly enfranchised towns along the Tyne which 
collectively objected to Newcastle's control of the port. 
Non-conformity was strong in these growing Tyneside 
areas as it was in Sunderland. The Lambton influence in 
Durham provided a solid foundation for Whig success. In 
1832 the Whigs won all seats in Durham and all but one 
on Tyneside. Tory expectations grew as reform fever died 
down and as early as 1833 gained an early success in 
Sunderland. 
Perhaps two significant features of the political 
world of the north east in the 1840's are worth studying 
in some depth. Firstly, aristocratic influence was ever 
present in society in the first half of the 19th century 
and it was not undermined by the new economic forces 
described above. In fact, the aristocracy retained its 
political influence throughout the 19th century, owing 
to their willingness to exploit the new forms of wealth 
12. 
on their estates which supplemented the income from 
agricultural developments. Many family fortunes depended 
on the collieries especially that of the Lambton's. 
One authority has described the Lambton estate as 
28 
"primarily a mining property" and even the Times could 
describe County Durham as "little more than one huge 
colliery" from which 
"the cities, the villages, the nobility, the clergy ... 
and, we must add the farmers in the County of Durham 
all derive their wealth or their competence from 
coal".29 
The landed gentlemen of Durham and Northumberland in the 
1830's and 1840's took particular interest in the working 
of their minerals for coal profits allowed landowners to 
continue to exert enormous power. Entry to their ranks 
was not restricted for they were more than willing to 
admit newcomers as the history of the Ridley family in 
South East.Northumberland proves (See above p.6). 
Secondly, it would seem that the North East was 
less moved and aroused by the great questions of the day. 
The Corn Laws, Factory Reform, the condition of the nation, 
none of these created within the region as much interest 
as seen elsewhere in the 1830's and 1840's. 30 The 
movement for agricultural protection seems to have met 
with limited response. Geographical isolation, the 
peculiar economic preoccupations of the region and the 
continuing influence of the aristocracy may help to 
explain resistance in the north east to major political 
movements. The debate over the Navigation Laws produced 
more excitement and the north east reacted most vehemently 
13. 
to Peel's re imposit i on of the export duty on coal, in 
1842. Where s uch a vita l in t e r es t was a t sta ke, regiona l 
. d 31 response was un~te . Chartism receive d much s uppor t 
throughout t he v i llages i n the north-eas t a nd the re was 
much sympathy for those who advoca ted 'phys ica l f o rce ' . 
Geordies also invested enthusiast ically in the 'land 
scheme' in t he 18 40's: but i nteres t in the milita nt 
aspects of t he movement waned afte r 183 9 and the link 
wi th the more violent members proved emb a r r a ssing t o the 
miners i n t he struggle of 1844 . Neverthe l e ss, the links 
between the two remained strong a nd the re developed a 
l f h . d . . . . 3 2 mutua respect or t e ~ r ~st ~nct~ve a~ms . Rad ica l 
politics i n general became the med ium for t he growing 
political asp i rat i ons of the ' shopocracy' . Embittered 
by t h e d i sappo intment of t he 18 32 reform bill and 
d i si llus ioned by t he l a ck o f initiative shown by the 
reformed c o rpora tions o f Newcastle and Gate shead after 
1835, this g roup began to p l a y a leading r ole in the 
managemen t o f rad i ca l fo r ces in the region. 33 
14 . 
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CHAPTER 2 
Peel's Economic Policy: 
Aims and Methods 
The final three years of the Melbourne administration 
saw the Whigs with increasing financial problems. 
Politically committed to the practice of 'cheap government•, 
they had reduced direct taxation as far as possible and 
had come to rely increasingly on indirect taxation. 
Therefore, they left themselves with no room for financial 
manoeuvring especially when the economy slid into a 
depression in the late 1830's. Revenue fell and by 1837 
there was no surplus. The following three years saw 
deficits. Baring the Whig Chancellor of the Exchequer 
proposed a 5% increase in Customs and Excise and a 10% 
increase in Assessed Taxes. This was the first budget for 
many years to make general increases in import duties. 
However, the times were not favourable and a deficit 
remained. Baring now decided to adopt the policy recommended 
by the recent Committee on Import Duties and reduced 
duties in the hope that increased consumptionwould lead 
to higher returns. In the spring of 1841 he proposed a 
reduction in the duties for timber and sugar. 1 Prolonged 
debates over sugar which hinged on the inconsistency of 
Whig fiscal strategy led to the defeat of the government 
and the consequent dissolution. In an election that was 
dominated by the national issue of free trade Peel was 
returned with an undisputed majority although Lord John 
Russell had hoped to force Peel into a protectionist 
corner by adding corn to Baring's list of reductions. 2 
Peel's most pressing economic problem when he became 
Prime Minister in 1841 was thus the budgetary deficit. 
Revenue was falling and there would be an accumulated 
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deficit of some £7.7m over the five years ending in 
April 1842 (the deficit for the single year 1841-42 would 
amount to £2 .. 5m alone) . 3 Peel's radical solution to this 
financial problem was a re-introduction of the income 
tax for a period of three years. This would raise an 
estimated four to five million pounds and would enable 
the government to reduce the duty on important consumable 
items and thus "diminish the pressure of taxation on the 
great articles of consumption". 4 Sugar and corn were 
obviously priority items under this heading. 5 With 
regard to the former, Peel realised that two obstacles 
delayed any immediate alteration. Extensive negotiations 
would be needed with the Brazilian government concerning 
the 'conditions of slavery' before any treaty could be 
agreed. Secondly, any remission of duty on British 
colonial sugar unaccompanied by any corresponding 
relaxation with regard to foreign sugar would yield -no 
benefit to the labouring classes for it "might merely 
confirm a monopoly and give the advantage of lower duty 
to the producer and not to the consumer". 6 Although Peel 
was prepared to accept lower levels of protection than 
those suggested by Lord Ripon's programme of tariff 
7 
reform, he still considered protection to domestic corn 
production vital. Peel was determined at this stage to 
resist vigorous lobbying from agriculturalists or 
leaguers and keep in sight the basic interests of the 
country: 
18. 
"The principle on which we ought to proceed in 
reviewing the Corn Laws is, to disregard the 
consideration of future clamour, or extravagant 
expectations on either side, and to bear in mind as 
far as we can the permanent and comprehensive 
interests of the country; among which encouragement 
to domestic production occupies a prominent place".8 
Peel was not happy with the operation of the existing 
sliding scale and saw the inherent weakness of the 
system which allowed extensive abuse by merchants and 
corn factors and sudden and extensive variations in the 
amount of duty on foreign corn. He hoped to achieve 
several benefits by a restructured scale:;'just protection 
for agriculture''; ngreater steadiness of trade" and 
~·appropriation of some part of the gain to the Exchequerh.9 
Throughout his correspondence with members of his 
Cabinet,Peel stressed that continued protection was 
still his aim: 
"We must substitute protection for prohibition 
and must set about considering what will constitute 
fair protection".lO 
He was not at this stage prepared to sacrifice major 
domestic interests which were to receive fair protection. 
However, some areas of provision would need little 
protection - live animals and fresh meat; 
Peel decided to tackle the problem of the Corn 
Laws first;but he warned the House that this should not 
be regarded as the commencement of a general assault on 
the laws. This was a deliberate rebuff to the Anti-
Corn Law League which proclaimed the Repeal of the Corn 
Laws as a panacea for all or most of the crises of 
society: 
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"I feel bound to declare that I cannot recommend the 
measure I am about to propose by exciting the 
hope that any alteration of the Corn Laws will 
be a remedy for some of the evils which, in a 
great manufacturing country like this seems to 
be inseparable from the system".11 
There were three significant features to the 
restructed scale which he proposed. Firstly, the duty 
would never exceed 20s. Secondly, it would be imposed 
when British corn was priced at 50s and would diminish 
by ls per shilling rise in price. Thirdly, there would 
be two rests in the duty: between 52s and 54s, the 
duty remained static at 18s; and likewise between 66s · 
and 69s the duty remained at 6s. Hopefully, this would 
deter speculators from withholding corn and therefore 
providing greater price stability vital for farmers 
particularly at harvest time. The consumer gained 
cheaper corn, for duty was now reduced by some 50% i.e. 
between 59s.and 60s the existing duty of 27s 8d would 
be cut by more than half to 13s. 12 
Peel now turned to the great technical question of 
the day - finance. In his speech to the House he 
stressed that the budget defici~forecasted for 1842 
and 1843 would bring the total deficit for the period 
1838-1843 to an aggregate of £10m. Reduced expenditure 
was not an acceptable solution,for Peel felt that this 
would impair the protection of Britain's commerce and her 
imperial possessions. Therefore, there was a need for 
a new permanent source of revenue. He rejected the 
increased taxation of consumable items; nor would he 
countenance the expedient of continued loans or an issue 
of Exchequer Bills. 
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Having eliminated all alternative means of 
increasing revenue, Peel turned to a tax on income as 
the only viable means of immediately restoring the 
finances of the nation and he therefore looked to the 
wealthy to do their duty: 
"Instead of looking to taxation on consumption -
instead of reviving the taxes on salt and sugar -
it is my duty to make an earnest appeal to the 
possessors of property for the purpose of repairing 
this mighty evil ..•. I propose that, for a time to 
be limited, the income of the country should be 
called on to contribute a certain sum, for the 
purpose of remedying this mighty and growing evil. 13 
Peel therefore, proposed an income tax of 7d in 
the pound (i.e. 3% tax) on all incomes above £150 per 
year. The profits of farmers were to be assessed at 
one half of their rental. These financial proposals 
were intended to yield £3.7m and therefore, in order to 
extinguish the deficit and obtain a surplus in order to 
carry out tariff reform, Peel intended to supplement the 
income tax with two other sources of revenue. Firstly, 
Ireland which was exempt from the general operation of 
Peel's proposals, was to contribute in the form of 
increased duties on spirits and stamps. Secondly, Peel 
proposed to extend the tax on coal exported in foreign 
ships (4s per ton) to all coals exported in British 
ships. This, of course, had much significance for the 
North East. Peel justified this decision by pointing to 
the dramatic fall in revenue from coal exported in 
foreign ships. Peel blamed the operation of the 
reciprocity laws for this decrease and he defended his 
decision to extend the tax by stressing the encouragement 
given by British coal to foreign industry: 
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"I cannot conceive any more legitimate object of 
duty than coal exported to foreign countries. I 
speak of a reasonable and just duty and I say that 
a tax levied on an article produced in this country -
an element of manufactures - necessary to 
manufactures - contributing by its export to 
increase the competition with our own manufactures -
I think that a tax on such an article is a perfectly 
legitimate source of revenue".14 
Peel estimated the total yield from these sources 
to be £4.3m. Taking into account the sums required for 
existing operations in China and India, he arrived at 
a net surplus of 1.8m. What did he intend to do with 
this surplus? Peel revealed a programme for the total 
remodelling and rationalisation of the tariff system 
on the general principle of removing all prohibitory 
duties and reducing all import duties on raw materials 
to 5% or less and those on all manufactured goods to 
20% or less. Of 1200 dutiable articles on the book of 
tariffs, 750 would have their duties reduced with a loss 
to the exchequer of £270,000. The duty on foreign and 
colonial coffee would be reduced with a loss of some 
£171,000 although for reasons outlined above there was no 
reduction in the duty on sugar. The duty on foreign 
timber was lowered while Canadian timber was to be 
admitted at a minimal duty only. The loss was estimated 
at £600,000. Working on these figures Peel arrived at an 
over a 11 surplus of £520,000 for addi tiona 1 expenditure in 
the •,yars in the Far East. Peel concluded this speech 
by appealing to the House and to the upper classes in 
general to shoulder the burden of "upholding the public 
credith and checking the growth "of this mighty evil" 
(the deficit). He exhorted his audience to emulate their 
fathers who had made a similar sacrifice in the J8. years 
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of war up to Waterloo. They had accepted a property tax 
of 10%: surely this legislature could submit to· a lesser 
burden during a time of peace, especially as all the 
indications were that prosperity was increasing amongst 
the upper classes. 
The third branch of his fiscal policy was the 
Customs Duty Bill introduced in early May. This 
contained the alterations in the tariff outlined above. 
Peel admitted that there were notable exceptions - namely 
sugar- but through his programme ran the general 
principle that comprehensive tariff reform would 
benefit all consumers and substantially reduce the cost 
of living: 
"I contend that its (new tariffs) inevitable effect 
must be to give great advantages to all classes 
of consumers, and to make a considerable reduction 
in the present cost of living in this country ... I 
am persuaded that the general result will be to 
make a considerable saving in the expenses of every 
family in the Kingdom". 15 
Peel met _more opposition from his own ranks than from 
the Whigs who, apart from opposition to the income tax, 
criticism over the absence of sugar reduction, the 
compromise on corn and the impost of exported coal, 
accepted the main bulk of proposals. 16 The agriculturalists 
in his party, in particular, objected to his proposals 
for cattle and meat. Peel proposed the lifting of the 
prohibitory duty on cattle and the retention of a 
uniform duty of £1 per head which he considered sufficient 
duty and protection (dead carcasses would be admitted at 
8s a cwt). Peel tried to appease the agriculturalists by 
pointing to the superior quality of English meat, the 
lack of any real competition from the continent except 
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Holstein and Jutland and the fact that cthe entry of Irish 
cattle which, had increased dramatically, had made no 
effect on the price of meat. The agriculturalists were 
not satisfied and wanted a duty variable with the 
weight of cattle. 17 To this Peel would not concede. 
Summing up, Peel stressed that he hoped damage to 
individual interests would be minimal for he emphasized 
that: 
"The general result of the whole will be to increase 
the demand for the employment of industry" 
and also": 
"increase the means of the people to command the 
comforts and neccessaries of life".18 
After the political battles surrounding the 1842 
Budget~ Peel returned to the economic front in 1844 
when he prepared to tackle two outstanding economic 
problems - the contentious issues of the currency and 
sugar dutie.s. 
In 1844 an opportunity arose to revise the Bank 
Charter Act of 1833. The 1819 Act had put the currency 
back on the gold standard but it had failed to deal 
with vital questions concerning the issue of paper 
currency. The act did not ensure sufficient bullion to 
cover note issue; there was no legal restriction on the 
issue of paper currency and over 400 banks were 
entitled to issue their own notes. There were two 
rival schools of thought concerning the volume and control 
of currency. The 'Banking School' preferred the volume 
to be decided by bankers and, therefore, circulation 
would depend on prices, wages and the level of economic 
activity. The 'Orthodox School' whose strongest 
* See Chapter Three. 
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supporters were to be found in the Bank of England, 
considered that speculation and inflation were caused by 
unrestricted circulation. They saw a strict relationship 
between paper issue and gold reserve and called for the 
centralization of currency control in the hands of the 
Bank of England. Such a system would obviously arouse 
great opposition from the country banks and there would 
be much criticism if the government exerted indirect 
control over the only centre of note issue. 
Peel had sat on all four currency investigations . 
between 1819 and 1841. In a detailed memorandum to the 
cabinet he examined the arguments for and against the 
rival schools of thought and the attendant political 
pitfalls. The features of his proposed Bank Charter 
Act represented a middle course but in his preamble to 
the bill he veered towards a greater restriction of the 
volume of paper currency and he stressed th~ danger to 
the economy from the over issue of notes unsupported 
by reserves of bullion. Free competition led to 
''extravagant speculation" and 11 complete insolvency''. 
Peel's Act separated the Bank of England into two 
departments - issue and banking. Note issue was to be 
related to a specific amount of bullion and securities. 
The fiduciary issue was not to exceed £14m. P=ivate 
banks of issue were to be restricted and no new ones 
were to be created. Finally, there would be a weekly 
statement published by all Banks of issue. 
Many economists and bankers thought the credit 
restrictions imposed by the bill too rigid. Financial 
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crises would be intensified for now the Bank of England 
could not issue at its own discretion. Peel accepted that 
at certain times the restrictions would have to be 
relaxed and the law suspended: but they would be 
exceptional crises and should not undermine the principles 
underlying his act. Those in authority in the future 
would have to judge for themselves when suspension was 
necessary. He stressed this point in a letter to the 
Governor of the Bank of Eng land: 
"My confidence is unshaken, that we are taking 
all precautions which legislation can prudently take 
against the recurrence of a monetary crisis. It 
may occur in spite of our precautions and if it 
does and if it be necessary to assume a grave 
responsibility for the purpose of meeting it, I 
dare say men will be found willing to assume such 
a responsibility".19 
Within three years Peel advised Russell to do just 
that in the financial crisis of 1847. 20 
The question of sugar duties had been postponed since 
1842 but there was a need for new legislation on sugar 
in 1844 for in that year the Brazilian treaty expired 
and therefore it was an opportune time for a reappraisal 
of the sources of supply. Up to 1844, the supply of 
sugar to the U.K. had been a West Indian monopoly for 
duty on this sugar was 25s 3d a cwt., compared with 
63s for foreign sugar. However, growing domestic 
consumption was rapidly exceeding the capacity of West 
Indian planters to meet it. Therefore, prices had risen 
and this was a situation which was unacceptable to the 
public and committed free traders. A reduction in duty 
would not result in an automatic drop in price as long as 
the monopoly existed and this would have an adverse 
effect on the revenue, for sugar accounted for 1/3 of total 
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revenue from customs. The government were forced to examine 
other sources of supply. The purchase of slave-grown sugar 
was an unacceptable alternative, for Peel had fought against 
the Melbourne Government's sugar proposals in 1841 on anti-
slavery grounds. Likewise, there would be outrage from 
the powerful West Indian lobby after they had been forced 
to accept emancipation. The East Indies offered a more 
tempting source. The sugar was produced on free 
plantations but the scale of development in Java and the 
Philippines was only limited. The existing Brazilian 
treaty stated that if East Indian sugar was admitted 
Brazilian sugar must be given the same commercial status. 
The East Indies would have to be given encouragement to 
expand but arrangements would have to be made to maintain 
the West Indian privileges. Goulburn suggested two stages 
to the alteration of the sugar duties. In 1844 the duty on 
imported for~ign free sugar should be reduced to 34s which 
would still leave imperial producers with a lOs preferential 
margin. The following year the government could examine 
further reductions dependent on the plans for the renewal 
or termination of the income tax. 
There now ensued a political battle that alienated 
Peel from the majority of his party and led to his threatened 
resignation. Free traders and protectionists throughout 
the House united: the former wanted the duty reduced on 
all sugar- free, imperial, or foreign; the latter objected 
to a decrease in imperial preference. Russell proposed the 
abolition of the distinction between foreign and imperial. 
This was defeated but the motion of P. Miles, a leading 
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West Indian spokesman from Bristol, was carried. He 
suggested the reduction of imperial duty to 20s and the 
retention of 34s for foreign free sugar. Peel was angry 
at the absence of support from his own ranks and he 
threatened resignation. He refused to accept the Miles 
proposal or return to old duties. Peel supported a new 
motion which restored the preferential margin to lOs;but 
he feared the worst. Stanley appealed to the party and the 
motion passed, much to the Queen's delight. Peel was 
eventually convinced that the rejection of a minor detail 
of his tariff programme did not constitute a revolt by 
the party against his commercial philosophy. 21 
1845 was the occasion for Peel's second great 
experiment in tariff reform. The income tax would expire 
in that year and, therefore, Peel along with Goulburn would 
have to plan their future fiscal and commercial policy. 
Peel was determined to renew the income tax for a similar 
(or longer) period if possible - sweetened with a further 
round of tariff reductions. He explained to the House the 
financial facts of life. There was an expected real surplus 
of £5m in April of that year. If the income tax was allowed 
to lapse and there were no other charges, there would be a 
surplus of £2.5m for the year 1845-46. After that there 
would be a deficit, for other sources of revenue would no 
longer be available and the government intended to increase 
services expenditure by £1m. The logic of the situation, 
therefore, demanded a renewal of that income tax which would 
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produce a working surplus of £3.5m in April 1846, and enable 
that surplus to be returned to the public in the form of 
remissions of those taxes. 
Peel, therefore, proposed a reduction ir sugar duty -
the duty on colonial sugar was lowered to 14s and that on 
foreign free to 23s 4d. He proposed the abolition of all 
export duties on British goods and the abolition of imported 
duties on 430 articles, including the duty on raw cotton, 
glass and the duty on auctions. These proposals 
constituted a loss to the revenue of £3.3m - over 1/3 was 
incurred over sugar - and Peel asked the House for an 
extension of the income tax for a further three years. Peel 
had hoped to extend the tax for five years but settled for 
three and he told the House that he looked forward 
optimistically to the termination of the tax at the end of 
that period. 
The official Whig opposition denounced the income 
tax as inquisitional and unjust but, nevertheless, they 
signified their intention of voting for it. 22 The prospect 
of a massive surplus if the Whigs were returned to office 
b . l . 23 was o Vlous y very attractlve. Peel was very pleased 
with his bold strategy and considered his 'coup d' etat of 
1842' equalled by that of 1845. The repeal of the customs 
duty on raw cotton and the manufacture of glass had won over 
the House. Nothing, however, had been done for agriculture. 
Its omission from the budget was ominous. the protectionists· 
were anxious concerning his next move now that sugar duties 
had been reduced. However, Peel stressed that no extra 
burdens had been imposed on the farmers - the repeal of the 
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auction duty was, in fact, a marginal benefit. The corn 
laws now stood in splendid isolation. 
The issue which finally focused attention on the corn 
laws was of course the growing threat of famine in Ireland 
which followed the failure of the potato crop in the autumn 
of 1845. In the face of cabinet disunity over possible 
alteration of the corn laws, Peel passed the poisoned 
chalice to Russell. He had no more success in constructing 
a cabinet which would be able to tackle the crisis with 
unanimity24 and, therefore, Peel found himself charged yet 
again to solve this major problem. He returned to office 
on the 20th December with full Cabinet support for abolition 
of the corn laws - only Stanley had refused to join him. 
Peel outlined his strategy to Goulbourn. His aim was to 
avoid giving "undue prominence to corn, but to cover corn 
by continued operation on the customs tariff" 25 and 
finally remove all unnecessary tariffs and customs in one 
last attack. 
"Let us leave the tariff as nearly perfect as 
we can ... Let us put the finishing stroke to 
the good work".26 
Russell gave the Queen assurances of support and the cabinet 
gave their assent. Peel now seemed in a position to tackle 
the crisis successfully, but Lord Heytesbury warned him of 
another impending crisis. Although his cabinet now saw the 
necessity of the course he had adopted with the "object of 
preserving the Empire" from men so "thoroughly reckless" 
as Grey and Cobden, the country squire~ would be blind to 
the benefits of Peel's proposals. 
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"Bolstered up by the violence of their own little 
conclaves, and looking rarely beyond the 
preservation of their seats in parliament, it is 
to be feared that the desire of avenging imaginary 
wrongs will prevail with them against the dictates 
of prudence and sound policy".27 
On the 22nd January,Peel addressed the House of 
Commons and defended his change of view and the process by 
which he had come to remove protection from industry ·and 
agriculture. He examined the case for protection and 
explained how he had been won over to the arguments in 
favour of tariff reform. Careful consideration and 
observation of the economics of free trade had convinced 
him of the need for abolition of the corn laws. In his 
summing up he stressed that none of his aims could be 
considered inconsistent with true conservative policy. Any 
attempt to improve the material condition of the people 
and thus promote social harmony was the best guarantee 
against thr~ats to the traditional institutions of the land. 
Peel proposed a reduction in duties on a wide range of 
products and articles - soap, sugar, timber, tobacco. On 
corn he announced that duties would be reduced progressively 
until 1849 when they would be abolished, as would the duties 
on all other cereals. The duty on corn would stand at lOs 
when domestic corn was less than 48s a quarter: and 
diminishing to 4s when the price rose to 53s and above. 
Peel saw the encouragement of .high farming techniques as 
the real solution to farming problems and his package of 
measures was designed to assist the improvement of 
agricultural methods. Reduced duties on crops vital to 
pastoral farming would benefit the rearing and fattening 
31. 
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of livestock. Financial compensation for the farming 
community was provided in rate reductions and the provision 
f d . l 28 o ra1nage oans. 
Peel's package was not enough to convince the bulk of 
his party who opposed abolition that they should be 
prepared to enter a brave new era of scientific farming 
unprotected by legislation. Throughout the debates on the 
corn laws, Peel relied heavily upon the support of the 
Whigs. When this support was denied over the Irish 
Coercion Bill, the protectionists had their revenge. 
In his final speech to the House as Prime Minister, 
Peel had stressed yet again that his strategy was designed 
to meet the needs of the working population of the nation 
as well as assisting the development of the major interests 
within the commercial and agricultural sphere. Peel had 
attempted to reconcile these elements to his strategy for 
he aimed to promote prosperity throughout the country. 
Tyneside and its hinterland provide an interesting area 
in which to assess how well his policies were received, 
for although commercial and industrial activities were 
important, many in the region were still dependent on the 
land. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
Peel's Budget of 1842: 
Impact and Reception on Tyneside 
In the financial debates of the summer of 1841 
Peel's challenge to the Whigs perhaps inevitably provoked 
a counter-challenge. What alternative did he and his 
supporters propose in order to remedy the financial 
deficit? Peel, however, resisted such inquiries; it 
was the Whig ministers who were under examination for 
they had failed to find a satisfactory solution to the 
financial state of the country. The Tory press took a 
similar line: 
"We have said so much of the revival of the budget 
of May because it was seen to be the only resource 
relied upon by the "Deficit Administration" and · 
their adherents. They may, however, have some 
other resource; but if they have, why not tell it? 
Why is it the subject to be inquired of from the 
right honourable member of Tamworth and not from 
her Majesty's paid ministers?"1 
Nevertheless, the Peel Ministry took office amid an 
air of expectancy. Now they were the government, the 
constitutional niceties no longer shielded them and they 
would be obliged to disclose their own solutions. Some 
political commentators considered that once in office 
Peel would be forced to adopt liberal measures; and yet 
he would be unwilling to reveal the true extent of such 
2 
measures in order to preserve party loyalty. The Whig 
Charles Greville, pessimistically accepted what he now 
saw as an 'established fact in politics'. 
"The Tories only can carry Liberal measures. The 
Whigs work, prepare, but cannot accomplish them; 
the Tories directly or indirectly thwart, discourage, 
and oppose them till public opinion compels them to 
submit, and then they are obliged to take them up".3 
The Liberal Newcastle Chronicle was even more 
pessimistic than Greville. Far from expecting the Tories 
to bow to the pressure of public opinion, the champion of 
3 6. 
the Anti-Corn Law League in the north-east held out 
little hope for a radical alteration in the operation 
of the corn law. Obviously, there would be some "show 
of relief", 4 but in reality the new ministry would 
maintain "the restriction with all its concomitant evils 
as severely as before". 5 
There seemed little to suggest to the Chronicle that 
the unemployed, destitute and hungry could expect a more 
compassionate attitude from the new Tory administration. 
In fact, it feared more reactionary measures: 
"Instead of measures of relief, they threaten us 
with a war against machinery and a repeal of the 
Reform Bill".6 
Peel was seen as a defender of the agriculturalists 
and the landed aristocracy, the basis of Tory power and 
influence, against the rise of the 'millocracy'. No 
matter how the new economic measures were dressed up, 
the country was in for a period of harsh and austere 
legislation. 
The Journal, which represented hardline Tory views 
was convinced that Peel could cater for the economic 
interests of all groups. When he finally disclosed his 
fiscal measures in the Budget of January 1842, the 
Journal was quick to claim that the Corn Bill was proof 
that a new stable economic order could be maintained. 
The new Corn Bill represented in its 'suitableness' and 
'justness' .a "compromise between the claims of the two 
great interests" 7 and "in its just appreciation of 
national interests it displayed the pure and ardent 
patriot". 8 On a more technical level the great virtue of 
the bill was the stability that it imposed: 
37. 
" ... it is free from the sudden jumps and jerks which 
characterised that which it is intended to replace".9 
The Journal's sentiments in the north east were shared 
by the Times which expressed its "general satisfaction" 10 
with the bill and acknowledged that it satisfied.those who 
wanted some protection but considered that the old system 
was over-favourable to the landed interest. It had many 
virtues, one of which was the attempt to eliminate sudden 
changes: 
"Little as we ever liked a sliding scale, we are 
still less attached to what has been justly called 
a skipping scale. We have no longer to lament or to 
be perplexed by those sudden leaps".ll 
Charles Greville was less convinced. He recorded, 
for instance that feeling in the City and pol~tical 
circles was not over-sanguine as to the beneficial 
effects of the new corn bill. 
"There are however, "he conceded", a great many very 
different opinions on the subject, the result of 
the whole being that the measure is preferable to 
the present scheme; that it will be quite harmless 
to the producer, and may be of some service (but 
not much) to the consumer".12 
Greville was not impressed with the presentation 
of Peel's policy in the Commons and considered his 
approach ambivalent. Peel's speech was that of: 
" ... an advocate rather than of a statesman. But 
if he could speak his mind he would no doubt 
admit that he was arguing against his opinion and 
convictions".13 
Here was hardly the hero as cast by the Journal or the 
l d " . . . " 14 d . b d ea er of an honest Conservat1ve Mlnlstry as escr1 e 
by the Times. The nation looked in vain, in Greville's 
opinion, for a suitable leader; "But where are we to look 
for great men? The generation of them has passed away". 15 
38. 
The radical and liberal press of Tyneside found 
their earlier predictions confirmed by the new corn bil1. 
They regarded Peel's proposals with cynical scepticism: 
" ... it is evident that we are doomed for some time 
longer to endure all the evils and disappointments 
arising from the sliding scale".l6 
This was the final judgement of the Chronicle, the Tyne 
Mercury was even more pessimistic: 
"Everything that we have seen would seem to show 
that we are to have an alteration without a change-
an old face under a new mask".17 
On further examination, the Tyne Mercury remained 
adamant. "It looks well on paper, but it seems to us to 
disguise the old system of fluctuation". 18 The new 
sliding scale was a device to satisfy the industrial and 
commercial sector while maintaining protection for the 
agriculturalists. Greville's comments concerning Peel's 
lack of room for manoeuvre are echoed by the Tyne Mercury 
which felt .that this measure was another example of the 
Premier's " ... cringing and truckling to the Tories and 
h . " 19 t e ar1stocracy . Across the river, the Gateshead 
Observer expressed much the same views for it was savage 
in its condemnation of the new bill - "a mockery of a 
measure".
20 Again, 
"We have very great doubt whether it will be found 
in practice any relaxation whatever of the old and 
rejected law".21 
The Gateshead Observer had no doubt about Peel's motives: 
" ... the wily Premier has more of cunning than of wisdom 
• h • • • 11 22 1n 1s compos1t1on . Peel was less concerned with the 
welfare of the nation than "his chances of success as the 
23 
champion of monopoly". 
39. 
In the Commons, north-eastern M.P's. were equally 
critical of the new' bill. Edward Howard M.P. for Morpeth, 
strongly disapproved of the new measure. He considered 
that the free trade principles adopted for the other 
articles in Peel's tariff reform should be extended 
throughout. The new sliding scale was "partial and one 
sided" 24 and continued to give exclusive protection to 
the landed interest. Viscount Howick, Whig M.P. for 
Sunderland was as ever vociferous in his attack on Peel 
and the "faulty principle of the Act••. 25 The principle 
of the sliding scale was now proved to be totally 
discredited and had brought distress on industry, 
commerce and agriculture. Henry Liddell, Tory M.P. for 
North Durham, came to Peel's defence. He considered 
that Peel was justified in maintaining a fluctuating duty 
26 
and, thereby affording some protection to the farmers. 
As to ·Peel's ultimate goal and future policy, 
opinion was divided. Among the few marginal benefits 
the new method of assessing the averages; the option of 
levying the duty at source ~ the Chronicle could see that 
the alteration, however slight, signalled the eventual 
27 
abolition of the corn laws. The Gateshead Observer 
felt that there was little evidence as to the future policy 
f " 1" l"t" . " 28 o so s lppery a po l lClan . In the short term, 
protectionist lines would be followed under the guise of 
the sliding scale. This was only further proof of the 
need for constitutional overhaul of this "infatuated 
aristocracy". 29 According to Greville, opinion in the 
Westminster lobbies was more optimistic. The new corn 
law was "only the advance of a stage ... we are and must 
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be progressing to final repeal". 30 The real obstacle 
was in persuading the "ultra-Protectionists" to yield. 
Greville hoped that common sense would prevail: 
"for the prudent among them (a great minority I fear) 
will open their eyes to the reality of their 
position and act accordingly".31 
It would seem that Tyneside liberal opinion as reflected 
in the press did not share his opinion. 
The Times was convinced that the incumbent 
administration was prepared to continue along the road to 
free trade and that the programme of tariff reform 
indicated: 
" ... the determination of the ministers not only to 
act in good faith upon the principles of Mr. Huskisson 
but to carry them to a more systematic development 
than has yet been attempted by any of the predecessors 
in office".32 
The Chronicle and Tyne Mercury spearheaded the 
attack on Peel's reintroduction of the income tax. The 
Chronicle was in an uncompromising mood. "It is a tax in 
its nature most inquisitional; unjust (because unequal) 
and intolerable". 33 This tax which should have remained 
a wartime measure only, would intensify social and 
economic problems, stifle trade and was a direct threat 
to the 'precarious profit' of the middle classes. The 
Tyne Mercury adopted the same posture and considered 
that the i~position of this "most odious, abominable 
inquisitorial and unconstitutional of imposts" 34 would 
only drive the middle classes from these shores and "the 
absence of the talent and the intellectual power" 35 of 
these groups would be a grave loss to the Empire. The 
Gateshead Observer did not foresee such dire consequences 
but agreed that such a measure would stifle entrepreneurial 
41. 
expertise and drive and furthermore stem the "current of 
national exertion". 36 The liberal and radical·press on 
Tyneside was unanimous that Peel had committed a major 
tactical error by the inclusion of the middle classes in 
his target group for taxation. By taxing the "creators as 
37 
well as the possessors" of wealth, national economic 
recovery would be severely hampered. The Times agreed 
with. the Tyneside press on this point and preferied 
"charges to fall on those ... who have a continuing interest 
• h • 11 38 1n t e country - on property not on 1ncome 
Similar arguments against the income tax were echoed 
in the Newcastle City Council. Sir John Fife spoke out 
vehemently against the proposed measures stating that 
taxation should be "as little as possible vexatious" and 
should press heaviest "upon those whose protection had 
required so much of the blood and treasure of the country". 39 
He did not accept that such a radical fiscal measure was 
required for pressing foreign commiJiments - the existing 
problems in India were minor compared with the real 
emergency in the Mediterranean in the preceding 
administration. He was convinced that the China War would 
pay for itself. Objections were raised against the 
enormous power that such a measure would give to the 
government for it would "require the secrets of a person's 
trade to be laid open". 40 Speakers on behalf of the tax 
were few in number. One councillor questioned the right 
of the council to discuss such political matters. Another 
defended the measure in the light of the financial state 
of the country. However, there was near unanimity for 
the petition to the Queen which stated the Council's 
42. 
objection to the income tax. 
Feelings throughout the county of Northumberland 
would appear to have been just as strong for a similar 
petition against this measure was carried by 'acclamation' 
at a public meeting in Morpeth. Such a tax was described 
as: 
"indiscriminate in its application to incomes derived 
from professions, agriculture, trade and commerce 
and to incomes derived.from real and permanent 
property ... (and) is arbitrary and unequal in its 
principle ... (and) will in its operation be 
inquisitorial".41 
In contrast to opinion within the city, speakers pointed 
to the special problems posed by the imposition of the tax 
for those who depended for their living on agriculture. 
In fact, the tax would press more heavily on the 
agricultural classes than others. For those engaged in 
commerce, trade and manufacture, "it was a tax on ascertained 
receipts"; for the farmer, it was based upon returns 
which were at best speculative" and laid down on a high 
scale". 42 The new tax would inevitably lead to much 
unemployment in the county and ~his would mean a 
consequent rise in parish rates. There was, however, 
much sympathy for those who derived their income from 
trade, for regular fluctuations would make trade a poor 
basis for taxation. The middle class would be unable to 
employ the poor whose suffering would increase. In the 
county, the tenant farmers would likewise find themselves 
hard pressed financially. Peel's measures were, it was 
felt, a tax on "industry and intelligence"; what was 
43 
required was a tax on "real property as well as personal". 
43. 
Those who attended the meetings in Newcastle and 
Morpeth readily offered Peel alternative means of 
increasing revenue. A graduated property tax was the 
most favoured scheme - but there was also much support 
for the admission of foreign sugar, increasing the 
existing probate duty on land and the alteration of the 
stamp duty on cheques. Feelings against the proposed 
tax ran high throughout the area and persisted well into 
the following year for the High Sheriff of Northumberland 
received a request in February 1843 for a county meeting 
to consider "the evil workings of the income tax••. 44 
Over 600 names appeared on the petition representing 
landowners, farmers, tradesmen and others. Farmers 
were able to talk from bitter experience of the impact 
of the "oppressive and unjust'' tax over twelve months. 
Their ability to employ and increase production had been 
severely limited and they warned of severe consequences 
. 45 
for the county as a whole . 
The county meetings reveal the general disappointment 
felt within the farming community concerning Peel's 
agricultural policy. Many considered that he had betrayed 
agricultural interests even though the 1841 election had 
returned a parliament committed to protect such interests 
against the tariff programme of the Whigs. Some suggested 
that the latter may have been preferable to Peel's 
measures; some support was forthcoming for instance, for 
Lord John Russell's proposal of an eight shilling fixed 
duty on corn, in April 1842 in the light of Peel's revised 
scale. The premier, it was claimed, was "always in the 
rear of public opinion" 46 and had ignored party interest 
44. 
in the name of "legislative expediency".4 7 He had thrown 
"his professions to the winds" and had passed three 
measures all detrimental to agricultural interests: the 
modification of the corn law; relaxation of restriction 
on the import of foreign cattle; and the three per cent 
income tax on half of agricultural rentals. Some 
suggested that Peel's main aim was to protect the 
landowners in parliament and the absence of the gentry 
from the meeting was specifically noted. One angry 
speaker suggested a tax on the Carlton Club. The same 
resentment was present early in 1843 and Peel was 
criticised for "sacrificing the farmers interests at 
the altar of party ambition". 48 Sir John Fife hoped that 
such blatant attempts to maintain the privileged 
position of the landowning aristocracy would unite the 
working class and middle class in a concerted effort to 
obtain a "free and fair" representation of interests in 
1 . 49 par lament. Sir John's opposition to the tax reflects 
feelings in city and county and, on the evidence of these 
meetings, there appeared to be much hositility to the 
income tax within the commercial community on Tyneside 
50 
and the agricultural community throughout Northumberland. 
The Journal had little to say in reply to the 
criticisms of the income tax within the region. The main 
line of defence was to stress the two great virtues of 
such a system of raising revenue: 
"There is less waste, less expense in its collection 
than in that of any other and there is a greater 
certainty of produce".Sl 
45. 
In the Commons, Henry Liddell stressed that the 
imposition of such a tax in peace time was warranted 
because it was designed to meet the needs of the war 
started in the middle east during the previous Whig 
administration. The income tax was perfectly justifiable 
in the light of Whig financial maladministration and 
was therefore "quite sufficient to justify any government 
departing from a fanciful rule of this nature". 52 
Ironically, there was much support in the Tyneside press 
for the financial strategy of the Whig ministers. The 
Chronicle was convinced that the Whig financial programme 
offered an adequate solution. The Gateshead Observer 
agreed and considered that the measures of the previous 
53 
administration had been poorly explored. Viscount 
Howick followed a similar line by attacking "such an 
onerous Tax". 54 
There was an unusual degree of support throughout 
the Tyneside Press for Peel's proposals for tariff reform 
(with the notable exception of the Coal Tax (see below)). 
"These reductions will no doubt do good and it is 
pleasing to see Tories advancing so far in the way 
of a more liberal scale".55 
The Journal praised Peel's "carefully and wisely adjusted 
t "ff" 56 ar1 . The Tyne Mercury was forced to admit 
initially, "we must admit that in the way of provisions 
• • 11 • 11 57 
... much benef1t w1 accrue to the commun1ty . The 
Gateshead Observer welcomed the reductions in duties on 
d . . 1 58 d h T. coffee, timber an l1ve an1ma s an t e 1mes was even 
more impressed: 
46. 
"With regard to the commercial part of the Ministerial 
plan we are also well satisfied. The relaxations 
proposed are judiciously and fairly apportioned in 
such a way as one might expect from Sir Robert Peel's 
application, clear sightedness, and impartiality".59 
The Chronicle, however, detected an element of inconsistency 
in the decision of Peel to allow the importation of 
livestock while continuing to restrict the import of corn. 
The reaction within the Newcastle Press illustrates 
the differences over economic policy within the community. 
The Journal remained a supporter of colonial preference 
and applauded Peel's continual assistance to trade with 
the colonies which enabled these areas to develop: 
"of all trades in point of certainty, value and 
importance that between the mother country and her 
colonies is the best. It enriches both and is 
placed beyond the reach of foreign jealousy or the 
accidents of foreign war".60 
Britain's colonies had been and were the basis of her 
strength and prosperity: "what had England been except a 
third or fourth rate power without her colonies?"61 In 
view of these comments, it is small wonder that the 
Journal gave full support to Peel's decision to retain 
the principle of colonial preference within a modified 
tariff structure. The Tyne Mercury saw the preferential 
system as unnecessary. Free Trade would bring universal 
benefits: 
"Free trade is, and must be, the most perfect of 
all trade -the more free you make it •.. the better 
it must prove to all parties concerned".62 
Free trade would thus lead to an "increase in capital" 
and an "improvement in wages••. 63 
47. 
Colonial preference had worked greatly to the 
advantage of timber merchants and shipowners alike on 
Tyneside. The proposed reduction in duty on imported 
foreign timber would have a major impact on this vital 
seaborne trade. However, the new tariff met with a mixed 
reception from interested parties in a public meeting in 
Newcastle. 64 Newcastle shipowners accepted that tariff 
reform might well lead to a revival of trade and an 
attempt to impose a minimum freight charge was resisted. 
A lengthy debate among interested parties in su.nderland 
d 1 . d h d h f . . 65 un er 1.ne t e brea t o op1.n1.on. It was generally · 
agreed that the North American trade would suffer greatly 
especially as this accounted for over 800,000 tons a year. 
Unemployment amongst native sailors, emigration and an 
increase in foreign competition were all seen as likely 
consequences especially as the trade was going through a 
period of hardship. It was conceded, however, that the 
existing system did present problems. Much of the 
American timber was brought in colonial bottoms to the 
disadvantage of British builders. Previous to 1842 it 
had not been possible to import wood in the form of deal 
to be sawn in Britain. The equalisation of duties on deal 
and timber would benefit British timber merchants. Many 
considered that the Baltic trade was already lost to 
foreigners (However, it was doubted whether serious 
foreign competition would materialise for Baltic 
merchants who would probably take advantage of the 
favourable duties to increase their prices). The general 
view in Sunderland was that the new duties would lead to 
48. 
benefits for all connected with the timber trade in the 
long term although there would be initial problems. 
Therefore, it was unanimously agreed to accept the proposed 
alterations. 
The feature of Peel's economic package which 
raised most comment on Tyneside was undoubtedly his 
decision to impose a tax on the export of coal. Such 
attempts to raise revenue by this means had been 
abandoned in 1834. The Chronicle could foresee nothing 
but disaster for the new tax would: 
" ..... materially affect the exportation of the 
best coals but upon the small coals it must act 
as an effectual prohibition. The tax is greater 
in amount than their value".66. 
The Gateshead Observer saw this as a typical Tory measure 
aimed at exploiting a reliable source of wealth. The 
Tories had always looked upon: 
"The coal trade ... as a little black cow created 
for no other purpose than that of being milked 
for the benefit of the Exchequer".67 
The Journal was, of course, on the defensive but came to 
Peel's rescue with a plea that critics look to the 
expediency of the government's measure. The tax was a 
necessary form of raising revenue and one to which every 
continental state had resorted. Also, Peel was prepared 
to meet the coal producers and exporters half way by an 
offer of a 50% reduction as and when the occasion 
d d d d h l d ld b t . d 68 eman e an t e coa tra e wou e sus alne . 
Where vital regional interests were at stake, some 
Tory M.P's., ignorning the defensive line taken by the 
Journal, criticised strongly the measures of their 
49. 
administration. The Tory M.P. for Newcastle John 
Hodgson-Hinde attacked Peel's measure as neither "prudent 
or feasible". 69 Revenue would not increase for expansion 
of production and export had taken place following the 
removal of the duty in 1834. A reimposition of such a 
duty would surely lead to a contraction of trade. The 
bulk of exported coal was 'small' - 'large' coal would 
still be required as before for the home market and, 
therefore, greater stocks would not be available. 
Finally, this measure would not, as suggested, restrict 
the industrial capacity of Britain's potential rivals and 
I 
I 
competitors- Russia, U.S.A., Belgium and Spain. Most 
exported coal went to Scandinavia, so there would be 
little indirect benefit to British industrial development. 
Another Tory, Henry Liddell, M.P. for North Durham, 
70 
continued this line of argument. The measure entailed 
the possible loss of markets to foreigners and endangered 
such a vital interest as coal. Vast sums had been 
invested in the coal industry and great numbers were 
employed in the coalfields. The shipping interest, in 
his opinion, would suffer similar consequences. 
For sheer weight of argument, the case brought by the 
coal owners themselves was seen as unanswerable. In a 
lengthy petition to Peel, the coal owners explained the 
benefits that had accrued to the industry and community 
since legislation of 1834 and the serious consequences 
71 that would follow any attempt to reimpose an export levy. 
the legislature of 1834 had conceded the principle that 
50. 
coal should be allowed free trade. Massive investment in 
the coalfields had followed 1834 and the expansion had 
resulted in a production increase - 634,000 tons in 1834 
compared with 1.5million in 1840. Such capital investment 
would now be lost. The coal produced for export was 'small' 
coal and, therefore, it had a limited market for home 
consumption. The recession would spread to shipping. 
The cost of imported goods would rise- to compensate for 
outward freight in coal. Massive unemployment was 
unavoidable. Above all, the high cost of British coal 
. 
would act as a stimulus to foreign states to develop their 
own resources and, therefore, provide secure foundations 
for advanced industrial development and eventually limit 
demand for British goods abroad. The Conservative 
government should heed the lesson of the legislators of 
1834. Free trade had helped to create the prosperity 
of the late 1830's, and the coalowners urged Peel to take 
notice of that fact: 
"They respectfully hope this beneficial principle will 
be acted upon in this case and that a trade which has 
arisen in prosperity by the abolition of the duty will 
not be blighted or destroyed by its re-imposition''.72 
Further petitioning stressed the blow to regional 
economic development for expansion of the coal industry 
had led to port development and the extension of the 
regional rail network. The social consequences would be 
disastrous for the male population especially who "from 
the peculiar nature of the employment are ill-adapted for 
any other description of labour". 73 This unemployment 
would affect shipping for 75% of all coal was carried in 
British ships. The reduction in demand would adversely 
51. 
affect their trade. 
The City Council of Newcastle echoed the fears of the 
coalowners. Speakers viewed with "regret and alarm" the 
export duty on coal which, it was felt, would prove 
"ruinous to the capitalist and coalowner and would greatly 
tend to destroy the demand for labour in the coalfields 
74 
of Northumberland and Durham". They feared greatly 
for the trade of Newcastle, and yet many doubted whether 
such a measure would increase revenue. A petition 
against the coal tax was carried with one exception. 
Richard Brandling took the opportunity to condemn, also, 
the income tax which, he warned members, would present 
further problems for all those members directly involved 
~n the coal trade. This "odious and inquisitorial impost" 
was, in his view, the real problem, and he upbraided his 
fellow counc6llors for "straining at a gnat and 
. 75 
swallowing a camel". 
The coalowners also received support in their protest 
from their employees. The pitman's main fear, however, 
was not the loss of export trade but rather the 
likelihood of a consequent lowering of their wages as 
their employers' profit fell. Within twelve months their 
fears had resulted in a public meeting at which 2000 
unanimously agreed to petition parliament against the 
export duty. Feelings obviously ran high for there was a 
call for the union of all pitmen in the United Kingdon 
.to guard against a general worsening of their conditions. 
Others called for restraint and warned of the possible 
52. 
disastrous consequences to pitmen and their families which 
would result from strike action. 76 
The coalowners lobbied through the Commons and Lords 
in an attempt to obtain a reversal of government policy .. 
They requested Lord Londonderry to intercede on their 
behalf. The new duties were "unnecessary and restrictive" 
and the government would be interfering: 
"With the prosperity of a trade upon the progressive 
increase of which not only the welfare of the coal-
owners but the comfort and happiness of so large a 
portion of the labouring population of the country 
depends".77 
In the same letter,the coalowners implored Lord 
Londonderry to stress to the government their concern 
over the prospective limitation of child labour in the 
. b 1 . 1 . 78 m1nes y eg1s at1on. This would only add to their 
financial problems. The committee had also turned to 
Northumberland's Tory M.P., Matthew Bell, for assistance; 
but his intercession proved of limited value. Lord Howick 
accused him of exerting pressure on the coalowners to 
accept the compromise offered by the government in the 
form of a 50% reduction of duty levied. The Committee 
stressed that the coal trade and industry would not be 
able to bear even this duty. The coalowners were not 
prepared to lie down before ministerial determination. 
79 Bell seemed only too ready to bow to the government and 
was savagely attacked by Howick for his complicity in 
assisting the necessary legislation to pass through 
1 . 80 par 1ament. Hedworth Lambton, M.P. for County Durham, 
came to Bell's rescue and considered his posture 
acceptable, although he voiced a common fear: much 
53. 
investment in coal would be endangered and even 
national security compromised for the mercantile fleet 
was th~ nation's "major nursery for seamen". 81 
By the end of the year opinion in the Northern Press 
was still sharply divided concerning Peel's economic 
strategy. The Journal still believed in Peel as the 
"Pure and Ardent Patriot". 82 The Chronicle and Tyne 
Mercury were extremely suspicious of the intentions of the 
"Slippery Baronet". 83 His policies seemed to have done 
little to alleviate economic and social problems. The 
revenue returns were most discouraging and indicated 
" ... the existence of severe distress on the part of the 
great mass of the population and of the stagnation of 
trade". 84 The decrease in excise returns was proof of a 
general lowering of living standards for it was claimed 
"The people had not the means of obtaining these articles 
of necessary or indulgent consumption in anything like the 
quantities they were wont to consume". 85 The Chronicle 
had already warned the ministers of the danger to social 
order if economic policies were not geared to improving 
basic living conditions for: 
"there can be no security to the country unless their 
claims (the working classes) and wants form unceasing 
objects of attention and solicitude" 
d " h d d . . . " 86 an an onest en eavour rna e to remove every lnJuStlce . 
The Chronicle unlike the Tyne Mercury had initially shown 
some sympathy towards Peel'.s economic stance. By the end 
of the year, opinion within the editorial staff had 
hardened and his policies were still seen as poorly 
disguised class legislation. 
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The Journal was on the defensive and attempted to 
present some justification for Peel's policies. The 
leading Tory paper was forced to admit that the revenue 
returns for 1842 were "by no means satisfactory"; but 
factors outside Peel's control were cited as responsible 
for this - the advance of the temperence movement; 
interruption of trade in riot torn areas; a relative 
slump in the spending power of agricultural workers due 
87 to the abundant harvests. 
'The Government declare that their plan is well 
received in the country' wrote the Whig diarist Charles 
Greville of Peel's budget of 1842. 88 This chapter has 
sought to examine the extent to which ministerial optimism 
was justified in one area of the country - Tyneside. 
The liberal and radical press in this area was prepared 
to look on Peel's measures with a degree of optimism 
in that they were a step on the road to free trade. 
The Tory Journal warmly applauded Peel's economic package 
although it was not wildly enthusiastic about the income 
89 tax. Nevertheless, there were many reservations over 
aspects of his proposals shared by all sections of opinion 
in the area. The shipowners were divided in their 
assessment of the impact of the reduced timber duties; 
but they decided not to petition the government against 
them. Farmers in Northumberland were convinced that 
his agricultural policy would cause much suffering to 
their ranks. Throughout the area there was virulent 
condemnation of both the coal tax and income tax. Each 
55. 
interest looked to its own and even potential income 
tax payers - coalowners, shipowners, merchants, farmers -
could find little compensation for themselves in the new 
tariff proposals. 90 
56. 
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Gash considers that the potential income tax payers 
dislike of the income tax was tempered with satisfaction 
at the new tariff proposals. 
CHAPTER 4 
Reaction to Peel's Budget 
of 1845 
Peel approached the budget of 1845 in more 
favourable circumstances than those surrounding his first 
great budget of 1842. There was a significant 
increase in revenue in several areas; a massive surplus 
of £5m was expected for 1845; and definite signs of 
economic rejuvenation and bouyancy were visible. Even 
the Queen in her opening address to parliament commented 
upon the "improved conditions of the country" and "the 
general state of domestic prosperity and tranquility". 1 
However, major problems still had to be faced. There· 
would be a significant decline in revenue for the two 
years after 1845. There was also the politically 
delicate question of the future of the income tax. Its 
continued life appeared crucial to a further round of 
tariff reductions. Peel had reversed the budgetary 
deficit left by the previous Whig administration and. 
had gone some way to meet the concern shown by the Queen 
in the 1841 parliament that "adequate provision be 
made for the exigencies of the public services" and 
"to promote by enlightened legislation the welfare and 
happiness of all classes of my subjects". 2 
Statistical research 3 would seem to support 
contemporary opinion that the country was experiencing 
an economic recovery. 1842 was a low point in the trade 
cycle: 1845 a significant peak. The rapid development 
of the railways acted as a major boost to the economy 
but foreign trade did undergo a period of expansion -
the total value of both exports and imports within the 
period 1842-1845 increased by some 30%. If increased 
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consumption is a useful guide to improving living 
standards as regional opinion believed ' (see be low), then 
there were solid grounds for optimism in the figures 
for the increased consumption of tobacco, tea, ·rum and 
wine. The amount of non-agricultural relief also shows 
a significant drop in this period of prosperity. 
The press in Newcastle seemed agreed on the 
encouraging signs. The Journal was certain that Peel's 
economic measures had brought important social benefits 
in their wake, and that these accounted for the" ... 
general amelioration of the condition and consuming 
capacity of the working classes". 4 Overall, there had been 
a dramatic improvement in the nation's economy, whilst 
declining revenue and accumulated deficiencies" ... have 
now been effectually got over; and the energy of the country 
is beginning to exhibit its active and buoyant character". 5 
Peel had s·hown that there was a viable economic alternative 
to reckless free trade - a lethal medicine in the opinion 
of the Journal: "We have seen too much of that dose already 
and shall avoid it as we would the deadliest poison" 6 
The Chronicle was less approving but could not deny 
the hopeful signs. The increase in the revenue returns 
announced at the beginning of the year was indicative of 
"the power of consumption on the part of the people of 
the country, ... the improvement of the state of trade 
since this time last year" 7 and was further proof "that 
the country has been in a gradual state of improvement". 8 
There was less common ground between the Journal 
and Chronicle over the details of the budget - especially 
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the extension of the income tax. The Journal had praise 
for that "exalted statemanship which sheds order and 
method over matters of the utmost complexity". 9 The 
retention of the income tax was essential for its 
abolition would "plunge the nation a second time into the 
embarrassment and perplexities attendant upon a deficient 
income". 10 The Times found less to applaud than the 
Journal in respect of the fiscal measures but also 
welcomed the measures of tariff adjustment and the 
obvious benefits to the lower classes: 
"It is decidedly popular in its tendency for, 
except in the matter of the income·tax, it 
emancipates commerce at the expense of property 
and ostent,.Xatiously favours the poor" .11 
The liberal press on Tyneside echoed the comments 
of the Times. The Gateshead Observer welcomed the 
removal of restrictions on trade and the consequent 
encouragement to commerce: 
"The tendency of the Budget is in the direction of 
freedom of industry and commerce. Let us be thankful 
therefore, that we have got so much from a Min{ster 
of monopolist manufacture".12 
The great advantage of the income tax was that it had 
released funds for the continuation of Peel's programme 
of free trade although the Observer still recognised the 
"gross inequalities" 13 inherent in the imposition of this 
fiscal measure. In a rare moment of sympathy for farmers, 
the Observer commented upon "the scurvy treatment of the 
farmer" 14 who was still forced to bear the burden of the 
tax in spite of considerable losses. The Tyne Mercury 
stressed the opportunity that was now provided for the 
abolition of other oppressive taxes. Its application to 
1 " 11 . . . 1 " 15 rea property was exce ent ln prlnclp e . Technical 
6 4. -
adjustments, however, were needed to relieve the unequal 
burden of the tax. 
The Chronicle adopted a more intransigent line and 
rejected outright Peel's economic package. The free trade 
measures in the budget were a cunning device to gain 
general acceptance for continued imposition of the income 
tax. Those who grudgingly supported the income tax in 
the hope that the lower classes would benefit were firmly 
reminded that "It is our firm belief that it is not 
possible to tax the rich without making the poor suffer". 16 
Such measures were designed 
"to divert public attention from the two great evils 
which it seeks to perpetuate (namely the income tax 
and the monopoly of the West Indian sugar interest)".17 
There was, however, general agreement amongst the 
"liberal" press over the likelihood of a permanent income 
tax: 
"Everything tends to the belief that it is the 
settled purpose of Sir Robert Peel to change as 
much as possible our system of taxation from an 
indirect to a direct one".18 
Again the Tyne Mercury saw Peel's aim as "fixing still 
more firmly the claws of the system upon the vital parts 
f h II . 19 o t e country . Their conclusion was supported by 
contemporary opinion outside the region. Greville 
states that his acquaintances saw the tax as a regular 
feature of fiscal policy: 
"Everyone regards this measure as a great wedge 
thrust in and as the forerunner of still more 
extensive charges and above all that the income 
tax is to be permanent".20 
The Times, which regarded the tax as "inquisitional 
unjust and injurious" was also convinced of Peel's 
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intention: "It will be a perpetual tax". 21 
The issue of the sugar, duties brought sharp divisions 
within the 'liberal press'. By the 1840's the debate over 
sugar centred on the question of the continued measure 
of protection which was necessary for the West Indian 
plantations. Protective or prohibitive duties were now 
seen as potential weapons to be used in the war against 
slavery outside the British Empire. 22 Abolitionists 
advocated protection as a means of excluding the produce 
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of slave labour from world markets and, thereby, encouraging 
the further decline of this institution. By 1843,an · 
alternative policy of free trade was voiced at the so-
called Second World's Anti-Slavery Convention in London. 
The 'free traders' stressed the point that free labour 
was cheaper and more efficient than slave labour and 
therefore, there was no reason to protect West Indian 
planters fFom the slave plantations of Cuba and Brazil. 
On the contrary, competition would force West Indian 
landowners to capitalize on their asset of free labour and 
drive slave produce out of world markets •. Continued 
commercial contact with Brazil and Cuba was a more hopeful 
way of communicating the moral argument than isolation and 
was more consistent with Britain's continued trade links 
with the cotton states of the United States. Those who 
stood firm by the 'protectionist' line stressed the 
importance of maintaining a strict moral posture. 
Commercial isolation was a more potent weapon than the 
dubious policy of maintaining normal trading relations, 
in spite of the possible shortage of sugar supplies and 
consequent discomfort for the lower classes. As for the 
inconsistency of accepting slave-grown cotton, the 
'protectionists' rejected this spurious excuse for using 
slave-grown sugar, for there existed an alternative 
source in the West or East Indies. 23 
This division over the strategy necessary to combat 
slavery, was reflected in the 'liberal' press in Newcastle. 
The Tyne Mercury accepted Peel's preferential duties as a 
practical solution to the vexed question of free trade 
and the importation of slave-grown products. Britain's 
unilateral declaration of emancipation had done little 
to encourage reciprocal announcements from the other · 
colonial states. Therefore, it was imperative that the 
West Indian colonies receive some form of protection for 
they could not possibly survive against the competition 
provided by those producers who used slave labour: 
"We have nearly ruined the colonies; but we are now 
further than ever from extirpating slavery from the 
world 11 .24 
The Tyne Mercury stressed that slavery was a 
"detestable system" and pointed to the continued 
contradiction in government policy whereby Britain 
accepted American cotton and tobacco (both slave-produced) 
but rejected Cuban and Brazilian sugar. 
The Chronicle, by contrast, was totally opposed to 
any policy which favoured the West Indian planters whose 
influence was seen to be at work over the Ministry. Such 
measures would deliver the home market "completely into 
the hands of the present monopolists to their great 
25 
advantage". The attempt to discriminate against slave-
grown sugar and thereby to give an air of respectability 
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to the West Indian monopoly, was an example of the 
"imbecility" and "obstinacy" 26 on the part of the 
Ministry. The Gateshead Observer, ever vociferous against 
monopoly, suppqrted the Chronicle. Although Peel's 
budget was generally well received (see above), there 
existed "sore blemishes": 
"the concessions made to the colonial interest and 
the renewal of the income tax on its present 
unequal footing".27 
The Chronicle warned of serious social and economic 
consequences if Peel's shortsighted policy was pursued. 
The trade of the friendly state of Brazil would be 
driven away and there was no guarantee that slavery 
would be discouraged elsewhere. The West Indies could 
not meet the demand from Britain which would lead to a 
loss of revenue from indirect taxation, a consequent 
raising of income tax in compensation and higher sugar 
prices for the working class. Slavery would, in short, 
persist and possibly expand without Britain's restraining 
moral influence, and all for the sake of that "insatiable 
• 11 28 1nterest . 
The Journal gave solid support to Peel over the sugar 
duties. An editorial stresied the two great virtues of 
the new preferential duties - the active discouragement 
of slavery by the increase in the sale of sugar produced 
by free labour; and secondly the continued protection 
afforded to colonial interests: 
"Millions of worth of manufacturers are annually 
exported to the colonies; they are compelled to 
take what they require from us; they largely 
contribute to our wealth and greatness".29 
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The Journal was convinced that Peel had balanced 
the needs of consumer and producer - the price of sugar 
would be lowered by some 20% and yet the colonies would 
not be ruined in the process. A bitter attack was made 
on all those free traders who opposed the new duties in 
the House. The Journal criticised their lack of 
patriotism: 
"those who champion the principles of commercial 
socialism and cry down the rights and the vested 
interests of the British Colonies".30 
The tone adopted by the Tyheside press rarely 
aspired to the moral heights scaled by the Times. The 
Tyne Mercury concentrated on the impracticability of 
equalisation of duties; the Chronicle was outraged at 
the encouragement given to monopoly while the Journal 
praised the continued support offered to the colonies. 
The 'Thunderer' rose to the occasion and, while admitting 
the existence of inconsistency in Peel's commercial 
policies, urged the Prime Minister to persist. 
"Be the crusade as visionary as that against the 
saracen, still it would be disgraceful to relinquish 
it".31 
In answer to Russell's criticisms in the Commons, the 
Times reminded its readers that there were "inexhaustible 
supplies" in India which would hold prices down as demand 
rose. Britain must continue to lead the world against 
slavery for 
"it is something to tell Brazil, the United 
States and Spain ... what we think of their National 
morality".32 
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Although deep divisions existed within the press over 
the question of the sugar duties, this was not reflected 
within the commercial community. After lengthy·debate a 
petition calling on the government to reduce the duties 
was passed by the Newcastle Chamber of Commerce, in the 
February of 1845. There were differences of opinion but 
the discussion hung on commercial rather than moral 
considerations. Many members felt that the Chamber should 
address itself primarily to the campaign to abolish the 
export duty on coa1. 33 
The clamour against the coal tax had been sustained 
since its imposition in 1842. The fear that the city of 
London was proposing to add to the burden on the coal 
trade by taxing all coal entering the port at an additional 
5 pence a ton, led to a unanimous call for the government 
to intervene on their behalf: 
"The coal and shipping interests of the North of 
England have been labouring under great 
depression and are utterly unable except at 
serious loss to struggle against imports already 
existing on the article of coal".34 
Nicholas Wood, speaking in the Chamber on the eve of 
Peel's budget statement, reiterated one of the main 
arguments against the coal tax for he did not consider 
it a "legitimate source of revenue''. He was also 
convinced that if it was repealed, 
"the increase of traffic would so far .counterbalance 
the effect of the repeal of the tax that the revenue 
would sustain no injury but would be improved".35 
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Peel's decision to remove the export duty on coal was 
greeted with prai.se throughout the press on Tyneside. 
The Tyne Mercury praised Peel for his good sense in 
repealing the duty. The Journal was now singing a 
different tune to that in 1842 (see Chapter 3 above). 
United opposition to the coal tax in the area may well 
have influenced its editor for it now condemned the 
principle of taxing exports as basically "vicious and 
unsound". 36 The Gateshead Observer was in congratulatory 
mood and applauded Peel's wisdom for listening to the coal 
owners. North-East M.P's. echoed the comments of the 
editors. Matthew Bell, the Tory member for South 
Northumberland, John Hodgson-Hinde, who had been a 
Conservative but was now a Liberal member for Newcastle, 
and Viscount Howick, the vociferous Whig M.P. for 
Sunderland, all spoke on behalf of the coal interest in 
Parliament. Bell defended the coalowners who had been 
forced to raise their prices,even though this had 
adversely affected sales and thereby impaired the 
ministerial plan which had aimed at increased revenue. 
In 1844 he had warned that the lower price of foreign 
coal would lead to the loss of many markets. Likewise, 
he pointed to the increase in consumption of coke abroad, 
the drop in the export of round coals, the parallel 
increase in the production of less profitable small coals 
and the increased dependence of many mines on foreign 
markets. Expanding production abroad could have resulted 
in the permanent loss of markets for English trade. 37 
Hodgson Hinde had also painted a gloomy picture of 
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approaching depression in the great northern coalfield 
l.f h l d 38 t e tax was not repea e . 
When the budget became law, the Chronicle looked 
increasingly to the Whig opposition for comfort. 
Russell's critical comments upon Peel's strategy drew 
praise from the editor. Russell's approach was considered 
to be devoid of all party or acrimonious feeling. The 
Whig strategy which paired unfettered industrial growth 
and the elimination of social injustice promised more 
beneficial results "than any of those high flown schemes 
of alleged philanthropy, which were laid before the 
House". 39 The Journal dismissed Russell's proposals as 
unsound. Peel had proved himself equal to the task of 
reviving the economy: 
"Distress had vanished; abundance of employment 
prevails throughout the great seats of industry; 
revenue has recovered its vigour and buoyancy; and 
complaints of distress or lack of work are unheard 
of".40 
Apart from the Chronicle, there was a grudging 
acceptance of Peel's expertise with regard to financial 
and economic problems, Greville noted the same reaction 
to Peel's administration after four years: 
"With all Peel's unpopularity and the abuse that is 
showered on him from various quarters, there is an 
admission, tacit or express, that he is the fittest 
and the only man to be Minister".41 
One important aspect of the budget continued to 
generate much speculation - the total absence of any 
statement in regard to the operation of the corn laws 
and the continuing distressing state of the agricultural 
sector of the nation. If there was much for those 
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engaged in commerce and for the working classes, there 
seemed little comfort for the agriculturalists. Even 
the Gateshead Observer could sympathize with the plight 
of the farmers. Cobden forced a discussion on the corn 
laws when stressing the harmful nature of the protective 
42 duties as they stood. Peel was willing to admit the 
existence of distress in some districts but saw "natural 
causes" as the main factors - drought; failure of the 
turnip crop and the disappointing hay crop. He did not 
accept that the corn laws .contributed to the distress. 
"I do not think the agricultural distress can in 
any degree be fairly attributed to the operation 
of those laws introduced by me".43 
When pre~sed, he refused to consider a readjustment."I 
cannot look to parliament for any further legislative 
interference". 44 . This was his only comment on the laws 
and effectively closed the door for those who advocated 
increased relaxation or further protection as a solution 
to social distress. 
Peel's ominous silence on the issue of the corn 
laws prompted many to speculate on the future of 
agricultural protection. The Chronicle was sanguine: 
"The days of the corn laws may, we suspect, be considered 
as numbered". 45 A change of course by the government was 
anticipated: 
"It is probable that he may change his mind on one 
question as on the other".46 
Greville echoed the comments of the Chronicle: 
"Everyone expects that he means to go on and in the 
end to knock the Corn Laws on the head and endow the 
Roman Catholic Church; but nobody knows how or when".47 
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This view found much support in the summer of 1845. 
Lord Broughton records a conversation with Sotheron in 
which the M.P. stated that the existing laws would not 
last "beyond the present parliament": 
"Sotheron told me that he had no doubt the corn laws 
would soon be abolished and that it was his duty to 
warn his constituents and make them prepared for 
it".48 
Broughton records that the Times had also interpreted 
Sotheron's speech as proof of Peel's resolve to repeal 
the corn laws. 
The Chronicle detected a further shift towards 
Whig policies by the incumbent ministry as a means of 
enhancing its popularity: 
" ... the alteration of the corn laws is only another 
of the 'stolen' suits of the Whigs in which they 
mean some day to present themselves to their 
deluded followers".49 
This interpretation of events was supported by Greville: 
"The truth is that the government is Peel, that 
Peel is a reformer and more of a Whig than a Tory 
and that the mass of his followers are prejudiced, 
ignorant, obstinate and selfish".SO 
This apparent rift between Peel and the backbone of his 
party was viewed with relish by the Gateshead Observer 
and an anticipated confrontation was long seen as 
imminent: 
"The sulky squires have not, as yet, screwed up 
their courage to a trial of strength with their 
master".51 
Developments in Ireland and on the mainland of Britain 
during the summer of 1845 forced the issue of the corn 
laws to the fore of public debate. The impending 
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disaster (see Chapter 5) led to heated debates in the 
1 C . '1 52 Newcast e 1ty counc1 . Sir John Fife was only too 
aware of the gravity of the situation and he called on 
his colleagues to petition the Privy Council to open the 
ports to foreign corn. He considered that "the state 
of the harvest threatened the working classes with a 
scarcity which in some parts might lead to famine itself". 
Furthermore, he warned the Council that 
"it was their direct and immediate duty to make 
every effort in their power to avert such a 
calamity". 
Others, however, did not see the problem as quite so 
urgent,especially as they believed the government was in 
the process of considering the future of the Corn Laws. 
There was much support for the view expressed by 
Mr. Armstrong who objected to any "tampering" with the 
Corn Laws. In his opinion, the best policy was not to 
"interfere" with existing legislation but to "allow the 
public with regard to the potatoes to consume them now 
while they were fit for consumption". Some accepted 
that the crop was affected in some parts of the country 
but believed that the loss was no greater than in 
preceding years. Others doubted whether the Council 
could petition the Privy Council on such a vital issue 
without positive support from their constituents. 
After lengthy and heated discussion, Sir John was 
able to win support for the following petition: 
"with the prospect of distress amongst the humbler 
classes of society in the United Kingdom and especially 
in Ireland from the result of the late harvest, your 
memorialists are convinced of the expediency of 
opening the ports of the United Kingdom to the free 
importation of grain". 
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The debate within the City Council was to mirror that 
nationally in the winter of 1846. The demand for action 
from the government increased steadily throughout the 
autumn of 1845; but there were many who feared for the 
consequences of any "tampering" with the Corn Laws 
(see below). Economic, social and constitutional 
considerations were foremost in the minds of those who 
were to oppose Peel over the next six months. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Corn Law Repeal Crisis of 1846 
Peel's attitude to the Corn Laws and their long term 
future was still a matter of conjecture and speculation 
in the Tyneside press in the early weeks of 1846, a year 
1 
which opened "most portentously" in the eyes of the 
Chronicle. This atmosphere was precipitated by a revelation 
in the Times on December 4th that parliament was to be 
summoned in the first week of January and that: 
"The Royal Speech will recommend an immediate 
consideration of the Corn Laws preparatory to their 
total repeal".2 
Peel and Wellington, it was reported, were "prepared to 
give immediate effect to the recommendation". 3 Although 
Peel wrote to the Queen and stated categorically that the 
claim by the Times was "quite without foundation", 4 
the Standard, the quasi-official mouthpiece of the 
government, was unable to contradict the Times without 
requesting a Privy Councillor to violate his oath". 5 
Nevertheless, the Standard rejected the story totally 
as mere guesswork. Greville was mystified, as was most of 
London society, but his diaries reveal the circumstances 
in which the claim of the Times had become public. 
Aberdeen, a supporter of free trade, had intimated to 
Delane, the Editor of the Times, that Peel had decided 
that the Corn Laws must go, that he would resign unless 
he had full cabinet support and that this support was 
forthcoming. Greville concluded that Aberdeen's leak to 
Delane was intended to assist his negotiations with the 
U.S.A. concerning the settlement of the Oregon issue for 
"Nothing tends so materially to the prevalence of 
pacific counsels as an announcement that our Corn 
Laws are going to be repealed".6 
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A week of public debate and confusion was brought to 
an end with the official announcement of Peel's resignation 
on the 12th of December. Russell's attempt to form a 
government proved forlorn and Peel returned to office on 
the 20th of December. The damage, however, had been 
done. Greville noted the "rising wrath of the Tories and 
landlords at the bare suspicion of the intended act". 7 
In the north-east, the Journal was likewise convinced 
that Peel was intent on repeal and was set on a course 
"inconsistent with his previous life, with his 
hitherto unstained integrity and with his lofty 
pre-eminence as a statesman, with his brilliant 
past services to the country".8 
The Chronicle did not expect such a volte-face. The 
necessity of maintaining party unity would force him to 
reconsider his strategy: 
"If he ever did contemplate a repeal of the Corn Laws, 
he had been obliged to modify if not abandon his 
project. We consequently anticipate no sweeping 
proposal upon the subject from him".9 
The continuing dominance of the aristocracy within his 
cabinet and the intransigent attitude of the Standard 
vis-a-vis repeal were seen by the Chronicle as major 
obstacles to any radical plans on behalf of the government. 
There was general agreement throughout the Tyneside 
press that repeal would lead to dramatic changes in the 
economic and social structure. The Journal forecast 
rural distress and social turmoil: 
"Repeal the Corn Laws and forthwith the landed interest 
of the country is wounded to its vitals. Repeal the 
Corn Laws and forthwith two millions of peoples are 
thrown out of employment".lO 
81. 
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The Journal stressed that the issue was basically a struggle 
between interest groups within the nation and warned of 
the threat posed to the landed class within the nation. 
The Chronicle saw a "dangerous collision'' between rival 
interests in the nation, the agriculturalists and the 
manufacturers. The Tyne Mercury by contrast welcomed the 
social consequences that would follow in the wake of 
repeal; "everything seems to indicate and everyone to 
expect that we are on the eve of a great social revolution", 
it wrote. Repeal would usher in "the overthrow of aristocratic 
tyranny and the establishment of popular rights". 
"The settlement of the free trade issue was crucial to 
the establishment of social justice ... for its 
settlement must decide whether the masses of our 
fellow countrymen so long doomed to see their claims 
neglected and their interests unheeded, shall 
participate in the blessings of what has been so 
boastingly but so falsely denominated a 'paternal 
rule'".ll 
The Queen's speech on the 22nd January gave little 
hint of the immediate future of the Corn Laws. She 
outlined the general nature of the government's free trade 
proposals while avoiding specific mention of the Corn Laws. 
The government's intention, it was announced, was to 
"maintain contentment and happiness at home by increasing 
the comfort and bettering the condition of the great body 
of my people". 12 If conclusive proof of Peel's intention 
to repeal was missing from the Monarch's address, his two 
hour speech whic6 followed indicated to many that ''he 
was resolved to go to all lengths in regard to the Corn 
Laws". 13 The detailed explanation of his commercial 
proposals followed on the 27th January. The duties on a 
vast range of articles were to be reduced including 
existing duties on a variety of imported foodstuffs. The 
House had to wait to the end of his speech for the 
proposals for corn. The duties would be reduced for three 
years and finally abolished in February 1849. The duty 
would stand at lOs when domestic corn was less than 48s a 
quarter diminishing to 4s when the price rose to 53s and 
above. So much for the 'bad news'. Peel hoped to win 
over the landed interest by assisting and encouraging the 
development of high farming techniques which he hoped would 
make protection an irrelevance. A nominal duty was 
proposed on maize and buckwheat which were important in 
the fattening of cattle. Reduced duties on linseed and rape 
cake would help to serve the same purpose. Similar 
reductions in the duty on grass and clover seeds would help 
to improve pasture. Financial compensation was held out 
in the shape of a comprehensive reduction in the burden of 
rates borne by the landed class following extensive reforms 
in highway and poor law administration. 
A more tangible measure of financial compensation came 
in the form of the drainage loan. Two million pounds was 
made available. This modest sum was designed to encourage 
high farming for which Peel was a strong advocate14 and 
there was much support in Northumberland for more scientific 
farming practices. Sir George Grey called upon his fellow 
farmers to ignore the artificial protection provided by 
the Corn Laws and to strive to achieve prosperity by 
collective effort. At the dinner of the Northumberland 
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Agricultural Society in October 1845 he stated that success 
in farming was to be had through "the application of 
capital to land and by th~ zealous and enlightened 
co-operation of landlord and tenant, [whether] other aids 
were given or withheld". He believed that by this 
approach "the British agriculturalists would not only hold 
his position but be enabled to compete with all the world". 
He also stressed the importance of drainage "which he 
believed to be at the bottom of every improvement". 15 
This theme was taken up by others. J.E. Wilkinson 
of Dunston, speaking at Newcastle Farmers' Club in the same 
month stated that drainage was "the first step in all 
agricultural improvement and when combined with subsoil 
ploughing, with a tolerable share of management and 
industry was calculated to double the present produce of 
the soil and thus provide food for a growing population". 16 
Other factors were seen to be working to the farmers 
advantage as well. Mr. Thew, speaking at the Northumberland 
Agricultural Dinner,was confident that the growth of the 
railways would assist the agricultural prosperity of the 
Alnwick area. Likewise, high farming techniques if 
pursued with vigour would only increase this prosperity 
for "when he looked at the rapid strides which had been 
made in the improvement of agriculture he saw ample 
evidence to show that the plans originated by scientific 
ld l d . " 17 men wou ea to prosper1ty . 
Opinion within the House of Commons concerning Peel's 
proposals would appear to have been varied although 
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predictable. "The protectionists were angry and 
discontented, none reconciled ... the Liberals generally 
approved though with some qualifications". 18 The Tyneside 
press reacted in a btoadly similar way. The Tyne Mercury 
responded to Peel's proposals on corn by describing them 
as "bold, comprehensive, liberal and commendable". 19 The 
Chronicle made little comment and gave Peel no credit for 
his espousal of a measure for which they had made continual 
demands. The Journal regarded the measure as a social 
disas~er: "God grant that its settlement may not be the 
unsettling of everything else". 20 Any government measure 
which weakened the economic and social position of the 
landed class was anathema to this class: "the guardians and 
protectors of the cause of native industry" who had 
"steadily fought the battles of the constitution and stood 
between the country and the revolutionary torrent". 21 The 
Tyneside press concentrated more on the 'stick' and 
virtually ignored the 'carrot' offered to the agricultural 
sector. The Journal had swept aside all talk of 
compensation even before the proposals became public. The 
corn laws were seen as the corner stone to the nation's 
political and financial structure - remove them and the 
results would be cat~strophic: 
"The corn laws are a national question. The system 
upon which they are based affects the whole 
structure and foundation of a nation's credit 
and its capacity to support the weight of taxation 
that is necessary for the public service and, 
therefore, they can never be adjusted on any 
principle of compensation to a particular class".22 
The Journal never wavered from this dogmatic stance. 
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The role of Ireland and Irish distress were examined 
by the Tyneside press in an attempt to assess the reasons 
for Peel's decision to repeal the corn laws. The Chronicle 
gave equal weight to events in Ireland and the influence 
of the League: 
"The 'mysterious' failure of the potato crop and the 
renewal of the agitation against the corn laws seem 
to have convinced him that the time was come when a 
different cours~ must be pursued".23 
The Chronicle was unwilling to analyse the history 
behind conversion but seems to reject the view that 
repeal was an inevitable stage in his progress along the 
road to free trade. Commenting on Peel's attitude to free 
trade the Chronicle stated that "attributing his conversion 
to the effects of his own measure is well calculated to 
t d b h . . . " 24 cas ou ts on lS slncerlty . The Chronicle found 
support from the Tyne Mercury. "The wind and weather" 
had wrought.havoc on the English harvest during August 
and the unseasonal weather had no doubt led to a 
"lamentable deficiency of potatoes" in Ireland. At the 
same time,the League's campaign had proved overwhelming. 
"No earthly power can now withstand the object of the 
League". 25 
Press comment on Tyneside reflected contemporary 
ignorance of the nature of the problems in Ireland. The 
official report issued by Lindley and Playfair (the 
scientific team sent by Peel) referred to "wet putrefaction" 
as a contributory cause of the potato failure and Lord 
Heytesbury, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, blamed the 
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"absence of sunshine••. 26 Debate amongst botanists and 
chemists was having no greater success in isolating the 
cause of the disaster or in suggesting possible treatment 
of the potato tubers. Most theories concerning the origins 
of the 'disease' were wild guesses. Only a minority 
held that potato blight was caused by a fungus which was 
seen as a consequence and not the cause of the problem. 
The main features of the life cycle of the fungus were not 
established until extensive research in the 1860's. It 
would take another forty years before potato spraying in 
Ireland with a sulphur-based mixture developed in the 
1880's was general practice". 27 
Opinion varied concerning the scale of the problem 
as well as its origins. The Journal was convinced that 
those who favoured repeal were making the most of the 
disaster to assist their cause; 
"The potato rot has been greatly exaggerated; and 
there is little to fear of the famine which was the 
chief groundwork for the vicious free trade 
measures of this ministry".28 
Reports from Ireland illustrated the 
"False and fraudulent character of the pretence 
that the corn bill was in anyway connected with 
the prevalence of the pressure of Irish 
distress".29 
The work of the League was instrumental in Peel's 
obsession with repeal: 
"What is Sir Robert Peel but the tool of the League, 
the disciple of Cobden, the fdllower of Bright, 
the companion of Hume and Villiers". 30 
Those who witnessed the development of the disaster 
first hand were convinced otherwise. In the autumn of 
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1845, Irish landowners warned of the probable magnitude 
of the failure of the potato crop and a deputation of the 
leading landowners called on Lord Heytesbury to adopt 
measures "to avert calamity". After initial investigation 
Dr. Playfair expressed a similar concern. They warned 
Peel in a letter: "We are confident that the reports are 
31 
underrated rather than exaggerated" and the final 
report of November 15th confirmed that 50% of the potato 
crop of Ireland was lost. Greville noted the growing 
political crisis at home: 
"That the mischief in Ireland is great and alarming 
is beyond a doubt and the government is full of 
alarm while every man is watching with intense 
anxiety the progress of events and inquiring whether 
the corn laws will break down under the pressure or 
not". 3 2 
The confusion over the scale of the problem is to be 
explained in some part by the unequal impact made by the 
blight. The south and south east were most severely 
affected; the east and north east were less so, for there 
was a better balance in these regions' economy. Therefore, 
the failure of 1845 was to some degree partial. Effective 
and rapid relief eased the situation. Elsewhere hopes 
that the blight would not return were dashed when the crop 
of 1846 proved a total failure. Peel was aware himself 
of a possible "tendency to exaggeration and inaccuracy in 
Irish reports"; but was prepared' to go ahead with plans 
for "removal of impediments to import" which he regarded 
"as the only effectual remedy". 33 
The Journal persisted in the accusation that much 
political capital was being made from the Irish drama by 
those who had ulterior motives: 
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"misrepresentations by the free traders were for 
no other purpose than to compass their own selfish 
ends".34 
The Chronicle did not subscribe to these views and was 
concerned for the suffering in Ireland and took the reports 
at face value: 
"Many are reduced to a state of great destitution and 
it is to be feared that in a very short time immense 
numbers will be reduced to a state of absolute famine".35 
The Chronicle saw repeal as the crucial remedy for the 
alleviation of the famine and upbraided those who allowed 
discussion on the Irish coercion Bill to take precedence 
over that for the alteration of the corn laws. This view 
was challenged by the Journal. Repeal would provide 
little immediate relief, for abolition would only become 
effective in 1849 and protection actually worked to 
Ireland's advantage because the mainland provided a ready 
market for her cattle and corn. The complexity of the 
situation in Ireland probably helps to explain the 
apparent anomaly that, during the period of distress 
1845-1846, vast quantities of cereals and livestock did 
in fact leave Ireland. The relative prosperity of certain 
regions unaffected by the blight resulted in the 
uninterrupted pattern of normal trade. Even in those 
areas where the blight had struck, various factors would 
have made it both impossible and impractical to attempt 
b f . 1' f 1 d' 'b . 36 to ase am~ne re ~e on cerea ~str~ ut~on. The 
Journal saw the root cause of much of the distress linked 
to a lack of employment: 
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"Scantiness of employment,lowness of wages and the 
absence of anything like the compulsory provision 
for the support of the poor".37 
There existed some common ground between the Journal and 
the Chronicle on this point. The Chronicle saw the 
provision of employment as crucial to long term relief. 
Much of the blame for the inadequacy of existing relief 
arrangements was laid at the feet of the landlords who 
had failed to co-operate with the government in providing 
effective relief. The complicity of the landowners in 
the social distress of the 1840's was at the centre of 
much political debate. The Devon commission established 
by Peel to examine the Irish land system in 1841 
revealed a complex situation in regard to the attitude 
shown by landlords to their tenants. Negligence, 
exploitation and sheer callousness were seen to exist 
side by side with sound, paternalistic management. The 
report drew the attention of the government to good 
practice where it existed, especially in Ulster, and 
recommended the recognition in law of payment of 
compensation for permanent improvements made by tenants. 
The harmful practice of indefinite subdivision was 
condemned; but it was stressed that this practice often 
existed against the wishes of the landowner. Little was 
done to follow up this report. Opposition within the 
1 d . . . b'll 38 Lords b ocke a t1m1d compensat1on 1 . 
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As it became increasingly obvious that Peel would be 
able to find the support necessary to drive his bill 
through the Commons, the Journal called into question 
the right of the House of Commons to repeal the corn 
laws: 
"Is the present House of Commons morally and 
constitutionally a fitting body for repealing the 
Corn Laws; it being admitted on all hands that a 
great majority was placed there for the distinct 
purpose and with the distinct understanding of 
resisting such a measure".39 
Turning its wrath upon the individual M.P·s., the 
Journal questioned their conduct in regard to their 
constituent s' wishes: 
" .•. to turn around and vote in the teeth of their 
constituents' wishes and their own recorded 
opinions, appears to us .•• to take advantage of a 
temporary trust and to betray the interests they 
were deputed to protect and shelter".40 
An examination of the 1841 election reveals that 
there is much to be said for the view that the electorate 
linked the Tories with a policy of protection. The 
Whigs had attempted to label Peel as an enemy to free 
trade and, therefore, they hoped to gain the votes of 
the urban areas. Of the 45 manufacturing seats the 
Conservatives won only 13- the same figure as in 1835. 41 
Therefore, as Professor Gash admits, "the cheap bread 
cry had failed to have any obvious effects in the towns". 42 
Miss Kemp has shown that there was a variety of issues 
at stake in the election. The 'condition of England' 
question was as vital an issue as the corn laws and the 
Tories were seen as more likely to pursue more rigorously 
policies which would attract even radical support -
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factory reform, improvement of urban conditions, alterations 
' th . t. P L 1 . 1 · 4.3 to e ex1s 1ng oor aw eg1s at1on. The Tories 
actually made a net gain of 7 in the large boroughs of 
10,000 or more inhabitants, capturing the liberal strongholds 
of the City and Westminster. The Whigs' attempt to force 
Peel into an uncompromising position as defender of the 
Corn Laws had backfired. Even though Peel may have hoped 
to broaden the base of his party, his strength and that 
of his pa~ty's still lay in the counties where the Tories 
made a net gain of 22. 44 It was here in traditional 
Tory heartland - the counties and the small boroughs -
that it was expected of the government to protect the 
Church and the Corn Laws. The Journal was, therefore, 
convinced that "The sitting members were sent expressly 
45 to uphold the corn laws" and the present parliament 
could not,"without an open breach of faith"f 6 sanction 
such a repeal. The Journal was therefore emphatic that 
M.P's. representing protectionist constituencies but 
sympathetic to Peel's proposals on corn, should quit 
their seats. Many did: Sturt retired from Dorset; 
Henniker from East Suffolk; Dawmay from Rutland; Charteris 
from Gloucestershire. Freemantle, sitting for the 
protectionist pocket borough of Buckingham, had likewise 
felt it his duty to take the Chiltern Hundreds, and 
Gladstone decided to vacate his seat at Newark following 
his acceptance of office. Both men found their protectionist 
patrons would not support their conversion to free trade, 
though Gladstone justified such aristocratic 'dictation' 
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by claiming that he considered it improper to support Peel's 
Government while receiving the patronage of the Duke of 
Newcastle who supported protection. The Journal was 
convinced that the public supported the protectionists in 
their struggle: 
"The country is with them and would show itself had 
it the opportunity of giving effect to its opinions 
on the hustings".47 
By-election results gave the government very little 
encouragement that the public supported their plans for 
repeal. Captain Rous who came into the Admiralty largely 
on the assurance that he could retain his seat at 
Westminster, was defeated heavily in February although 
the successful candidate was another free trader. 48 
Lincoln, who replaced Freemantle as chief secretary for 
Ireland, lost the consequent by-election in South 
Nottinghamshire after a bitter contest in which his father 
used all his· influence against him. 49 
The Chronicle considered the consequences of Peel's 
failure, however unlikely, to carry the House or the 
electorate over repeal and the possibility of a government 
by the 'country party'. Such a government would, in the 
opinion of the Chronicle, lack substantial electoral 
support: "of the futility of such hopes it is not 
. 50 
necessary at present to speak". It seemed unlikely 
to the Chronicle that all 112 Free Traders would be 
replaced by Protectionists in an election. In fact, the 
Chronicle seems to have judged the public mood better 
than the Journal. Of the 119 Free Trade Conservatives in 
the parliament of 1846, 88 were again candidates in 1847 
~j. 
and 78 re-elected. In addition, there were another 
35 conservatives newly elected who expressed support for 
Peel's Free Trade policies. 51 Another ·stumbling block to 
an effective government by the country party was the 
question of leadership and the lack of administrative 
experience within such a group. Stanley had shown 
reluctance to be involved in such a movement against Peel 
although he was the natural choice as leader of the 
Protectionists. In his letter of explanation to the 
Queen following his decision to retire from the Cabinet 
over repeal, he stressed his determination to minimize 
"The excitement which he cannot but foresee as the 
consequence of the contemplated change of policy". He 
had resigned rather than bear the burden of the "sacrifice 
of his own convictions", 52 but he assured the Queen that 
he could more usefully assist his Monarch and the country 
out of office. When he did finally accept the unofficial 
leadership of the Protectionists in parliament, he again 
underlined the natural weakness of a party which lacked 
"public men of public character and official habits in 
53 the House of Commons, to carry the government". His 
reluctance to assume the leadership may have been a result 
of the unsavoury, personal nature of the struggle waged by 
Bentinck and Disraeli with such ferocity. During the 
Corn Law controversy, Stanley confined his activity to 
the House of Lords and made little attempt to interfere 
with Bentinck and his parliamentary committee. There 
seemed, also, little likelihood of the country party 
sustaining their opposition to Peel after the repeal 
crisis. Many half-hearted protectionists might drift back 
to Peel's leadership,having satisfied the demands of their 
constituents. The case of Charles Adderley illustrates 
the possible ephemeral nature of the cohesion of the 
protectionist group. Adderley supported Peel's proposals 
to extend the grant to Maynooth and the government's 
education scheme. He deserted Peel over the Corn Bill in 
1846 but rejoined him during the second reading of the 
Irish Coercion Bill. 54 In fact, this latter division was 
seen by many as a vote of no confidence and some M.P's. 
returned to vote for the government. The Chronicle 
pointed to the divisions within the protectionists that a 
spell in government would deepen. Such a Protectionist 
government had less chance of withstanding "the pressure 
of events than those who are now so abused". 55 
Throughout the great debate of 1846, the 'liberal' 
press looked to the Anti-Corn Law League to apply much of 
the pressure upon the legislature and great hope was placed 
on the effectiveness of the League's campaign. The Tyne 
Mercury was convinced that the overwhelming influence of 
the League would carry the day for repeal. "No earthly 
power can now withstand the object of the League". 56 
This new-found power and strength of the League may well 
have derived from its campaign of registration, namely the 
creation of forty shilling freeholders entitled to vote 
in the next general election. This campaign, begun in 
1844 was an attempt by the League to carry the battle into 
h . 57 t e count1es. Although challenged in the courts in the 
95. 
autumn of 1845, the League eventually won judicial support 
for its new strategy in January 1846. By then, the 
league had already scored a major success in the by-
election in South Lancashire (July 1845) and early in the 
following year scored another in the West Riding. Both 
were key target areas for the League, for if it could take 
such heavily populated constituencies as these, such 
methods, determinedly applied, could yield many other 
shire areas with fewer electors. The Times was obviously 
impressed with the fortitude of the leadership of the 
league and the tactics they were employing: 
~wherein does the vital strength of the league 
consist? In the unbending, unyielding, implacable 
resolution, fixed purpose and unyielding demands 
of its chief men. This is the secret of its 
success".58 
The League's aim was to intensify their campaign of 
registration throughout 1846 ready for the 1847 election. 
Ironically, the Chronicle and the Tyne Mercury appeared 
to have lost little of their confidence in the 
effectiveness of the League's activities. The Tyne Mercury 
was not optimistic concerning an appeal to the country 
if the Corn Bill was rejected. For the supporters of 
59 free trade the result would be "unsatisfactory'' owing 
to the electoral influence of the protectionist peers. 
The Tyne Mercury had long campaigned against the claims of 
Lord Londonderry to 'dictate' to the North Durham and 
Durham City constituencies, even when they incidentally 
seemed to promote the return of a prominent free-trader, 
as h~ppened with the return of John Bright for Durham in 
96. 
1843. 60 Now it assumed (with others) that the ultra-Tory 
Londonderry was an example of protectionist peers whose 
influence should be done away with. The League's registration 
campaign would serve a greater social end by removing 
those who "would prop up the tottering fabric of 
61 
monopoly". The Tyne Mercury urged free traders to acquire 
forty shilling freeholds in the local area but also to 
inundate the House of Commons with petitions in favour of 
repeal. Such work was "unspectacular", but vital if 
Peel's bill was to survive in the Commons. 62 
The Journal was aware also of the potential social 
consequences of the new strategy of the League. At the 
inception of the 40s freeholder campaign, the Journal 
described the League's methods as a "conspiracy against 
electoral freedom. 63 As the campaign gathered momentum 
in the early months of 1846, it warned its readers that, 
if successful, the league would: 
"effect a transfer of political power from owners 
of property and those who have the greatest stake 
in the country to the rabble who shout and applaud 
the orators of the league".64 
In spite of the judicial ruling (see above), the Journal 
left its readers in no doubt that the new forty-shilling 
freeholders were, in the opinion of its editor, 
"fraudulent creations of the League". 6 ~ The lesson was 
clear to those who opposed the "well knit forces" of the 
League and,from the spring of 1845, the Journal urged 
protectionists to meet the League head on with a "bold and 
unflinching front". The Journal considered it most 
distasteful for "gentlemen" to adopt such tactics but 
" . 1 . " 66 the country members have no a ternat1ve . 
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In spite of the promptings of the Journal the north 
east did not respond enthusiastically to the protectionist 
cause. Agricultural Protection Societies were formed in 
Northumberland and Durham to marshall agricultural 
opposition to Peel. Response to their exhortations was 
limited and they contributed little to the national 
campaign. 67 The Duke of Northumberland had called 
passionately for the establishment of such a society 
north of the Tyne in 1844. 68 He feared that the rhetoric 
of the League would set labourer against farmer and farmer 
against his landlord. The abolition of protection to 
, 
agriculture would limit the farmers profit and prevent 
continuing improvements on the land. The work of the League 
had "sadly paralysed the improvements of the land by the 
farmers". 69 Furthermore, free trade in corn would remove 
' 
more land from tillage and therefore lead to unemployment 
and an increase in parish rates. The Northumberland 
Agricultural Protection Society was formed in Morpeth the 
following month and support around the county was soon 
forthcoming. In Hexham, a resolution warning of the dangers 
to the nation from free trade in corn was overwhelmingly 
supported for "Repeal of the Corn Laws would be highly 
prejudical not only to British Agriculture but to the 
. 70 
nation at large". Echoing the fears of the Duke of 
Northumberland, the Chairman of the Hexham meeting, a 
Mr. Langhorn, perceived the socially divisive nature of 
the aims of the League: "They are endeavouring to rend 
assunder the bonds of society - to place tenant against 
landlord and the peasantry against both ... who were 
98. 
really their natural protectors and truest friends". 71 
The inhabitants of Alnwick organised a petition to be 
presented to both houses of parliament but primarily 
designed to appeal to the Lords. It called upon 
parliament to resist the attempt· to reduce any further 
the protection afforded to agriculture for this would have 
"disastrous" consequences. 72 
However, support for protectionism within 
Northumberland obviously fluctuated. By the August of 
1844 the Tyne Mercury reported that only three attended 
one of the meetings of the county's Agricultural P~otection 
Society. Summing up the reasons for this the Tyne Mercury 
confidently explained: 
"The farmers really wish the trade thrown open, 
that they may have a certainty. The mercantile 
classes are to a man Corn Law ~epealers. The 
people will not stir an inch to help aristocratical 
monopoly".73 
The Journal called upon Northumberland to respond more 
promptly to the protectionist cause and warned that the 
county may have received a very dubious honour - "The only 
county in England without an Agricultural Protection 
Society". 74 Petitions were not enough in the eyes of the 
Journal: "the sons of Northumbria must rally around the 
75 
standard", and follow the example set by their fellow 
farmers in Durham where more interest in protection was 
certainly generated. 
The inaugural meeting of the Durham Agricultural 
Society was held in Durham City in February 1844 with the 
Duke of Cleveland as President and Lords Londonderry, 
99. 
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Ravensworth and Eldon as Vice-Presidents. Between one and 
two thousand were reported to have attended and the Journal 
proudly noted that the meeting represented Whigs, Tories and 
d . l 76 h . d . Ra lCa s. T e new members were glven a etalled analysis 
of how repeal would affect farms in the country and within 
a week the Provisional Committee for the Society had 
prepared a petition which opposed the repeal movement 
and in particular stressed the united nature of farmers, 
landowners, artisans and traders in the county. 
Interest in the protectionist cause was sustained 
well into 1846 and, with the announcement of Peel's 
conversion to free trade, a truculent meeting of the 
Agricultural Protection Society of Durham was addressed 
by the Duke of Cleveland. He stated that he had been 
opposed to the 1815 Corn Law which allowed prices to soar 
to levels which had produced famine. Likewise he would 
support repeal if it could be proved that the 1842 
adjustment had benefited only "the landed interest and 
those connected with the land". However, he feared for 
the welfare of the tenants and labourers if repeal was 
effected. His main argument concerned national security -
should Britain depend on foreign supplies of corn? He 
called for increased action on the part of the society, 
for they had been obviously "betrayed" ~Y the one 
h . . . l 77 w om they had lnstalled to protect agrlcu ture. In the 
face of such determination, Henry Liddell the County M.P. 
attempted to trim between repeal and protection, stating 
that he would support a repeal bill if the measures were 
"calculated to promote the interests of the nation: 
oppose them if they appeared to have a contrary 
78 tendency". He offered an alternative strategy to 
oppose the repealers - an extension of the principle of 
the Canadian Corn Law whereby the free importation of 
corn was extended to all colonies. 79 The resolutions of 
the meeting showed that the members stood behind Cleveland 
and the mood of angry determination matched those shown by 
outraged agriculturalists throughout England. 80 The 
meeting supported the view that successful high farming 
was linked to protection: "the protection afforded by the 
present corn law is not more than sufficient to keep up the 
progressive improvements in agriculture". The government 
was warned that it would be inconsistent to abolish 
protection for corn while retaining other duties. Lastly, 
the meeting endorsed the growing feeling that the 
existing legislature should maintain the 1842 Corn Bill 
"until by an appeal to the constituencies of the United 
Kingdom a national opinion is again elicited on the subject", 
and members were asked to work to see returned only those 
members of parliament "who will maintain protection to its 
81 present extent". 
If protectionists in County Durham were organising 
themselves to oppose Peel, there is also evidence of much 
activity on Tyneside by those free traders in support of 
the new corn bill. Several petitions were organised in 
the area. Eight thousand signatures appeared on one calling 
for the total and immediate repeal of corn duties which was 
. 11 f . 1' 82 sent to Henry L1dde or presentat1on to par lament. 
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A similar petition was sent from North Shields to the Lords 
for presentation by Earl Grey. This requested the Lords 
to pass the bill "in all its integrity with as little delay 
as possible". 83 The town council of Gateshead gave solid 
support to the Corn Bill in a petition which expressed 
the conviction that 
"the adoption of free trade in corn will not only 
promote the interests of all classes of her 
Majesty's subjects but will contribute more 
powerfully than either fleets or armies to the 
permanence of peace and the consequent happiness 
of nations".84 
The cause of free trade seems to have fared bette~ 
on Tyneside and in the North East than protectionism. 
The organisation was more effective and the response 
enthusiastic. The Times saw the failure of the 
protectionist cause to drive home its message nationally 
as a result of the weakness of the movement: 
"disorganisation and dissension among the country 
85 gentlemen, indifference on the part of others'~ This 
is certainly true of the North-East. Lord Londonderry 
was indifferent to the cause of protection to agriculture 
as most of his English estates were pastoral, and much of 
his income derived from coal. He even opposed the request 
from the Durham Agricultural Protection Society (of which 
he was a vice-president) that his son, Lord Seaham, should 
b . . . 86 e present at a protectlonist meetlng. 
By May 1846, the Journal was conceding that the 
battle to retain the corn laws was lost in the Commons. 
Much editorial space was devoted to vituperative attacks 
102. 
on those who had assisted Peel in his objective: "a 
league of conservative recusants, Whig - Radical bidders 
87 for popularity and manufacturing speculators". The 
Cabinet was described as a "base coalition" whose 
measures smack more strongly of "Cobden and Russell than 
. 88 
of Peel and Goulburn". The Chronicle saw the 
government supporters in much the same light: 
"a party of men holding no great principle in 
common and having no tangible object save the 
gaining of power".89 
The Journal now looked to the Lords for a last ditch 
stand: 
"We trust the Peers will not in this hour of peril 
shrink through any dread of false imputations or 
foul slanders from the free discharge of their high 
legislative functions".90 
The attitude displayed by the Lords to the Whig reforms 
of the 1830's may have given the Journal much hope that 
they would resist repeal in a determined fashion. In 
fact, the Reform Bill crisis had led to a perceptible 
change in the Lords' attitude to government legislation. 
Before 1830 they had shown a willingness to work with the 
Commons in support of government measures. Following 
the twin crises of Catholic Emancipation and Parliamentary 
Reform, the Lords displayed an increasing resistance to 
unwelcome measures and they placed many obstacles in the 
way of the Whig reforms, especially those concerning 
Ireland and the Church, where their interests were 
particularly affected. The Ultra-Tories in the Lords 
played a leading role in this resistance to the increasing 
103. 
demands of the populace. Peel maintained an uneasy 
relationship with the Ultra-Tories 1 but he recognised the 
importance of retaining some control over them and 
therefore, was ready to consult them when the need 
arose. 91 Wellington found it increasingly difficult to 
restrain them 92 and their intransigence to Whig legislation 
led to growing calls for reform of their constitutional 
power. Peel recognised this and he feared for the social 
consequences resulting from their alienation from the 
Commons and the public. 
The Journal pinned much of its hopes on the strength 
of the Ultra.Tories in the Lords who espoused the cause 
of protection: but it was the Whig Lords who held the 
decisive card. The Ultra-Tories had hoped for an 
alliance with the Whig Lords on the basis of the former 
Whig policy of a fixed duty. This alliance never 
materialised. Russell warned his colleagues in the 
Lords that any attempt to alter the Corn Bill was against 
his wishes and, if the Government resigned, then he 
93 
refused to continue as leader. This virtually assured 
the success of the bill in the House of Lords. The 
Journal was not surprised at their action: 
"Whig Peers, hungry for office will to a man, we 
know speak and vote in support of Peel's suicidal 
policy for they are paving the way for their own 
speedy return to Downing Street".94 
"The allurements and chances of office" would overcome 
principle. "Protectionists at heart and advocates in 
private of a fixed duty on corn, they nevertheless vote 
t ' h h ' ' II 95 o a man Wlt t e m1n1ster . 
If the Journal had hoped for a stand on principle 
104. 
from the Lords, it was sadly mistaken. Votes in this 
Chamber proved to be as unpredictable as those in the 
lower house. Here also was to be found a 
"Weather-cock majority who at the beck and bidding of 
the ·Ministers, renounce the principles of their 
whole lives and lend themselves to a course of 
policy of which they know nothing".96 
The Journal saw Peel's control of executive power and 
patronage and the extraordinary ''tact of the minister'' as 
a real danger to the legislative independence of the House 
of Lords. Peel was unable to command a majority in the 
upper chamber but by use of Proxy, he had establishd 
that any attempt to alter the bill in committee 
a tactic favoured by the protectionists - would be 
97 
checked. 
By contrast, the Chronicle was only too ready to 
praise the action of the Lords and to defend their 
position in the constitution. The Standard had adopted 
a line similar to that of the Journal, condemned the 
vote for repeal by the Peers as motivated by gain and had 
called for reform of the Chamber on the elective principle. 
The Chronicle's reply to the Standard's accusation 
dispelled the theory that the majority for the gover~ment 
was composed of 'pauper' lords hoping for gain. Its 
editorials even praised the lords, their vote had certainly 
averted a class war in the country, a fear Peel had 
expressed himself in his final speech 6n repeal on May 
15th. 98 Its praise extended even to a laudable comment 
concerning the dignity of the Ultra-Tory Peers in contrast 
to the shameful display of their colleagues in the lower 
house. So we are presented with the anamoly of the liberal 
press defending the status of the lords and the Tory press 
105. 
turning on the upper chamber. 
Common ground was found in an assessment of the part 
played by the Duke of Wellington in the passage of the 
Corn Bill in the Lords. His efforts to control the Ultra 
Tories throughout the 1830's had met with limited 
success. Their determination to defend the Corn Laws 
drove a greater· wedge between the Duke and themselves, 
although his sympathies lay with their point of view. 
He strongly criticised their attempt to gain access to 
the sovereign to present their views. Wellington believed 
that it was the duty of the Lords to co-operate with th~ 
other branches of the legislature or risk alienation from 
public opinion and support. His speech to the Lords on 
the 28th May followed these lines. Its impact is 
debateable. One modern biographer considers the 
peroration crucial in that it ''routed Stanley'' and his 
forces. 99 Lord Broughton placed little importance upon it, 
,1 00 describing the speecl) only as "strange'. Perhaps, as 
Professor Gash suggests, Peel's threatened use of the 
proxy and the Whig support for the bill in the Lords 
decided the day. 101 The constitutional implications of 
the speech, however, were not lost on the press. Both the 
Chronicle and Journal con6emned the Duke's comments - the 
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Chronicle was convinced that they were "highly unconstitutional". 
Such views would devalue the role of the Lords and it was 
' 1 II ' ' h d 10 2 t ' ' h . certaln y golng agalnst t e recor o lnslnuate t at 
the Queen's speech indicated her own political beliefs. 
Little support was also found for Wellington's theory that 
support should be given to the executive through a sense 
of loyalty. 
Even though the battle for the corn laws appeared 
to have been lost in the Lords, the Journal clung to the 
slender hope that it might yet be rejected at the third 
reading and, therefore, nn election would be necessary 
in which there would be a "fair stand up fight between 
free traders and protectionists". 103 The Journal was 
anything but sanguine concerning the consequences 
following the success of repeal -Peel's administration 
would be brought to a sudden end; Russell and the Whigs 
would assume office; the experiment in free trade would 
continue and their own short period in government would 
lead to increased domestic problems and disastrous 
consequences for colonial trade. In particular, a 
"weak truckling and unprincipled administration"104 would 
be unable to restore order in Ireland. The Whigs only 
thought was to gain office. 
"On the very threshold of power ... (they) think 
nothing of how best they may enter (the treasury). 
What is it to them that murders and butcheries abound 
in the sister Kingdom" .105 
The Journal had viewed with alarm the increasing disorder 
in Ireland and had called for the rapid passage of the 
coercion Bill in the commons to enable the ''suppression 
of Thuggism ·~106 But the protectionists had joined the Whigs 
by exploiting the opportunities provided by the bill -
firstly, to delay the Corn Bill and then to bring down 
the government. The Whigs were not alone in making 
political capital out of the deteriorating situation in 
Ireland. 
The Chronicle was far more optimistic concerning the 
consequences of repeal and it looked forward to a future 
107. 
where social and political harmony would be the key. 
The main cause of hostility between "landed, trading and 
operative" classes would be removed. Trade in corn would 
now operate accordi~g to the same laws as any other trade 
and therefore, the corn laws could no longer be held 
responsible for any adverse trends in trade. The 
Chronicle assured its readers that the "trade in corn will 
soon right itself" and "that prices ~ill vary little 
f h h . . " 107 rom w at we ave for some t~me exper~enced • The working 
classes would be offered a 'fair prospect' of employment 
and a reasonable standard of living. Above all, the L6rd·s' 
decision to pass the Corn Bill would remove the possibility 
of class war .. Even the Journal had to admit that the whole 
crisis had yielded some benefits. Although the country 
party had failed in its struggle against repeal, it had 
destroyed "the false glitter and polish which belong to 
the cry of cheap bread". 108 Also, the national debate had 
focused the attention of the public upon the merits and 
disadvantages of measures of "vital interest to the 
future welfare of all classes". 109 
Following the defeat of Peel over the Irish 
coercion Bill (25th June) and the subsequent resignation 
of the government the next day, the press turned its 
attention to analysis of the demise of Peel's administration. 
The Journal identified three basic factors - the 
association with the League had destroyed cabinet unity; 
the adoption by the government of the ~principles of 
others~ and the growing existence of a gulf between the 
government and public opinion, an 
"irreconcilable antagonism between measures of the 
ministers and the opinions of the great body of the 
nation".llO 
108. 
The Chronicle saw the immediate reasons for Peel's 
resignation in a slightly different light - the impossibility 
of prolonging a system for sugar with cabinet support 
when such a system had been abandoned for corn. Peel's 
record on sugar was inconsistent to say the least. In 
1841 he had opposed the proposed Whig reduction on sugar 
duties on the ground that insufficient imperial preference 
was offered to compensate plantation owners with rising 
labour costs. In 1844 he had modified his position. If 
the government was to retain the income tax it would need 
to offer the bulk of the population a reduction in 
taxation elsewhere. The amount of imperial preference 
proposed in 1844 was considered insufficient by many in 
the conservative ranks and Peel faced a revolt and defeat 
on his proposals through an amendment to the level of 
protection tor colonial sugar. Amidst much bitterness, 
Peel eventu~lly had his way. 111 Graham was aware of the 
problems associated with the sugar duties and the 
possible fatal consequences for the administration. The 
attitude of the country gentlemen was vital. Their 
acquiesence allowed the lowering of duties in 1845: their 
opposition (following the Corn Bill in 1846) and the 
threatened opposition of the Whigs would prove 
insurmountable in 1846. Peel was aware of this and 
accepted that defeat on the Irish Bill would signal the 
end of his administration. 
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The Chronicle had some harsh words for the protectionists 
in the Commons, and the treatment of their former leader: 
"forgetful of all party association and principle'' they 
had struck down the ministry "which they had found would 
b . h " 112 p 1' '11 . no longer su m1t to t em. ee s 1 ustr1ous career 
was not, the Chronicle forecast, at an end. "Ever 
ambitious for power", he was sure to return to office 
again al~hough not, it was hoped, at the head of a 
"party of discordant parties" 113 whose object, while 
in oppcsition, would be the destruction of a ministry 
and little else. 
Press judgement in Newcastle on the nature of Peel's 
premiership following his resignation was hardly 
complimentary. The Chronicle saw his record as, at best, 
inconsistent, and at worst unprincipled: 
"Has he not ever been remarkable for defending as 
long as he could every question entrusted to him 
and when no longer able to do so, to propose 
himself its repeal".114 
The Chronicle gave Peel little credit for placing the 
interests of the country above his party and concentrated 
on his political skills rather than his statesmanlike 
1 . . 115 h 1 d . b 1 . . qua 1 t1es. T e Journa was pre 1cta y savage 1n 1 ts 
treatment of Peel. The abandonment of principles which 
he had held for thirty years had brought: 
"The severance, in consequence of the treachery of 
that minister, of a previously great and powerful 
party ... he has done that which in private life 
would render him a subject for contempt and 
distrust for the rest of his days".l16 
In spite of the derogatory nature of the Journal's 
comments concerning Peel's behaviour, there was general 
agreement with the Chronicle over the accusation by 
Bentinckthat Peel was in some part responsible for 
I 117 Cannings death. Both rejected out of hand this charge .. 
The Journal in one if its final editorials on the 
collapse of the Government, contrasted the triumph of the 
Whigs after the crisis of 1832 and the demise of Peel's 
110. 
government. Grey's ministry had been enhanced by its 
success- Peel's-had been destroyed. By 1850, Peel was 
to achieve this same reputation of service to the nation 
hardly detectable in the comments of the press in 
Newcastle in 1846. The nature of his death had much to 
do with the growing reverence for the former P.M. Lord 
Broughton had no liking for Peel and was only too ready 
to believe the Canning allegation; 118 but even he was 
forced to admit, as Peel lay fatally injured, that Peel's 
acts "were dictated by a most conscientious sense of 
119 
duty~ Queen Victoria perhaps pinpointed the re-
appraisal of Peel after his death when she stated to the 
King of the Prussians that "his value is now becoming 
clear even to his opponents". 120 
The extent to which Peel deserves to be admired 
as a man who put country above party and sacrificed 
himself for· the nation's well-being must remain a matter 
of prolonged debate. 121 There was little in the North 
East press in 1846 to suggest that Peel was viewed in 
such terms. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Financial and Commercial Crisis of 1847: 
The Bank Charter Act of 1844 revisited. 
The roots of the commercial crisis of spring and 
1 summer 1847 are to be found in the previous three years. 
The separation of the functions of the Bank of England 
2 into issuing and banking departments had allowed the 
latter to trade more freely in the open market and had 
ushered in an era of cheap money. Interest rates set by 
the Bank were consistently lower than the market rate and 
this encouraged much speculation especially in the 
development of the railways. This orgy of speculative 
activity passed its peak in July 1845 and was succeeded. 
by a period of contraction in the money market. Two 
factors led to the prospect of a considerable drain on 
bullion well into 1846: the anticipated heavy importation 
of food to alleviate the famine in Ireland; and the threat 
of a poor harvest in 1846. This led to increasing credit 
restrictions in the financial world, and the impact of 
this was felt even more keenly in Lancashire which faced 
a shortage of imported cotton and a consequent depression 
in the textile industry. The Bank of England was not 
able to accommodate the money market as bullion reserves 
fell. In the first three months of 1847 its reserves 
fell from £13.4m to £9.3m. Bank rate was increased and 
the Bank announced that it would limit the bills it would 
accept. This helped to stabilise the money market for a 
time. Meanwhile, wheat prices began to soar and in May 
1847 reached 112s per quarter, a figure unequalled since 
1817. Corn dealers bought heavily to gu~rd against the 
future. Supplies however, responded well to demand and 
corn prices began to tumble especially as there were 
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encouraging prospects for the harvest in 1847. By 
August many corn dealers in London and Liverpoal were 
ruined and provincial banks, especially in Lancashire, 
put pressure on the Bank of England to assist them. 
When the Bank announced that it was unable to do this, 
there was a run on the banks in both Liverpool and the 
City and the Royal Bank of Liverpool closed its doors on 
October 18th. During the ensuing panic, the Bank of 
England raised interest rates to check the heavy demands 
made upon its rapidly diminishing reserves. The Government 
was finally forced to intervene·to protect the whole 
financial structure of the commercial world. On the 25th 
October the Bank published a letter from the Treasury, 
signed by Charles Wood, The Chancellor, and Lord John 
Russell, the Prime Minister, which authorized the Bank to 
provide additional loans on condition that a minimum rate 
of 8% was charged; and allowing the Bank to exceed the 
terms of the 1844 Act if necessary. The effect was 
instantaneous. Confidence returned to the money market 
and suspension of the act became unneccessary. 
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The commercial crisis of 1847 concentrated much 
criticism upon The Bank Charter Act of 1844 and brought 
to the fore once again the debate over the question of 
a convertible currency. The press in Newcastle saw the 
legislation of 1844 as the villain of the piece. The 
Journal was particularly harsh when assessing the harmful 
operation of the act. As gold was required to pay for the 
import of corn from the U.S.A. following the poor 
harvests, paper money would become scarce and the pressure 
on the money market would grow to a "storm of which we 
have heard the first opening gusts only'0 The need in 
the spring of 1847 was for an increase in the money 
supply which would enable increased circulation. The 
credit restriction imposed by the Act would intensify 
the crisis. 
"The inherent vice of Peel's Bill is 'the attempt 
to cut .down credit of which paper money is the 
representative sign, to a certain square rule 
proportion with the existence of metallic values 
in the Bank of England and in the banks of Scotland 
and Ireland but nowhere else~4 
The Journal seized upon another feature of the act 
which was considered to contribute to the developing 
crisis - the dogmatic emphasis within the legislation 
which was placed on the immutable relationship between 
paper currency and gold. This ignored the true resources 
of a great empire: 
"The safety or solvency of a great empire is made 
to depend not upon its capital and productive 
energies but upon the question whether there shall 
be precisely as much gold in banks as shall answer 
for all its bank notes afloat".S 
In fact, the Journal had altered its position 
considerably from.1844. It now saw the Act's main 
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virtues as serious weaknesses. The tight restrictions to 
credit imposed by the limitations on note issue were 
welcomed in 1844 as vital if reckless speculation was 
to be checked. Other means of credit were available 
(bills of exchange, promissory notes) and these would 
more than compensate for the necessary restrictions 
imposed. In 1844, the Journal fully supported Peel's 
strongly held views on currency convertibility and the 
stable economy: "there can be no sound system of banking 
on any other principle". 6 Three years later the Journal 
was prepared to reject this view and appeared to be 
adopting a view closer to the theories of Attwood - the 
amount of money in circulation should depend less on the 
bullion in the banks than upon the productive capacity of 
7 the country. 
The Journal had accepted in 1844 that there were 
intellectual limitations to Peel's understanding of the 
currency question: 
"of an inconvertible paper currency he has no 
comprehension .... His notions on the question of 
currency are of a very primitive kind and consequently 
vary as wide as the poles from those of the Attwood 
School. Sir Robert Peel is a statesman of an 
emminently practical turn of mind. With mere 
abstractions or idealities he rarely condescends 
to deal".8 
In 1844 this practical approach to the complicated issue 
of currency was hailed as a strength of Peel's armoury 
in tackling the banking question: in 1847 his lack of 
grasp of the technicalities and finer intellectual points 
was seen as a serious weakness in his strategy. The 
Journal took to task those who had so foolishly placed 
their confidence in Peel's financial expertise. 
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"The high reputation ... which has long been assigned 
to Peel for profundity of acquirement in financial 
and economic science till now has ·left him without 
a substantial opponent in the legislation. It was 
a reputation so deeply ingrafted in the public 
opinion out of doors, too, that it seemed like high 
treason to question its super pre-eminence".9 
Recent studies bear out this contemporary view that 
Peel was not an intellectual master of the currency 
10 debate. Although the legislation which effected a 
resumption of cash payments was credited to Peel in 1819, 
there is strong evidence that Peel leaned heavily on the 
views of Huskisson and knew little about the currency 
question in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee 
11 
which tackled this problem. Even Professor Gash, while 
pointing to Peel's "own long experience of currency 
investigations"12 , has to admit that Peel over simplified 
the relationship of note issue to financial stability 
and, because of his economic prejudices, "contemptuously" 
dismissed alternative theories of the anti-bullionists. 
The Journal pointed to the influence of other financial 
experts in the drafting of the Bank Charter Act and 
Professor Gash again shows how selected banking officials 
told Peel what he wanted to hear. 13 
The repeal crises had obviously soured the views of 
the Journal and there was some glee in its prophecy that 
the Act of 1844 would prove to be at fault in the existing 
commercial crisis. The regulations governing the 
fiduciary issue would have to be suspended and Peel would 
be forced to recommend such action to the Whig government 
which placed so much confidence in his ability. The 
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Journal however, had learnt to live with Peel's inconsistency: 
"We have seen how the immaculate author of the sliding 
scale has dealt with his own offspring".14 
The Chronicle had been far more critical of the Bank 
Charter Act in 1844. Two features of the legislation 
were singled out; the restrictions imposed on note issue 
could lead to a harmful contraction of circulation; and 
the act placed far too much power in the hands of the Bank 
of England and ultimately the Government: 
"It certainly seems too great a p6wer to place in 
the hands of any single corporation, especially one 
under the influence of the government".15 
The events of the spring of 1847 were in the opinion 
of the Chronicle, ample proof of the weakness of the 
legislation of Peel's administration. "From the act itself 
we never anticipated anything but mischief". 16 It was 
a "cumbersome and pedantic measure'' impractical to 
operate, likely to increase distress and it would restrict 
circulation when this should have been expanding. 
A more serious commercial crisis occured in the 
late summer and autumn of 1847. The Journal isolated 
three separate reasons for the financial problems of the 
autumn - the fierce competition from foreign traders 
resulting from free trade policies; the failure of 
exports to expand to keep pace with imports and the 
consequent ''efflux "of gold; and the restrictions placed 
on the money supply by the Act of 1844. The Journal was 
convinced that it was not alone in pointing to the 
harmful operation of the Bank Charter Act. 
"The Bank Charter act has much to answer for connected 
with these disastrous stoppages. City men know and 
feel that to be the case".17 
In fact, the Journal considered that Peel's economic 
legislation between 1841 and 1846 was in large part 
contributory to the crisis of 1847. The forelorn hope 
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of a rapid growth in exports occasioned by removal of 
tariff barriers had not materialised. Gold had flowed 
out to pay for agricultural produce following the poor 
harvests of 1845 ano 1846. However, his free trade 
policies had not yielded a compensatory rise in exports: 
not 'bne additional piece or twist of ribbon or calico". 18 
The repeal of the corn laws had not led to a massive 
increase in trade, a fact which, in the opinion of the 
Journal exposed the massive assumptions of the League. 
Three other causes popularly held to be responsible for 
the crisis were dismissed out of hand - over production, 
over speculation, and railway expenditure. 
Charles Greville attests to the variety of theories 
advanced concerning the panic on the money market but 
records that public opinion was convinced that railway 
speculation was responsible for the crisis: 
"Men are indeed pretty well agreed as to the cause of 
the present distress and in admitting that it is the 
result of over speculation, and of the Railway mania 
which fell upon the country two years ago".19 
The Bank Charter Act of 1844 was likewise viewed as 
~ggerating the crisis: 
"The country at large or a great proportion of it 
attributing to his financial measures the distress 
by which all are afflicted or endangered".20 
Contemporary opinion was certainly convinced that 
over speculation on the railways was the main factor 
contributing to the financial disasters of 1847. There 
was an underlying antipathy to speculators of all kinds 
for their activities were seen as a threat to traditional 
social values 21 and the scandal associated with many of 
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the bogus schemes of 1845 convinced the public that their 
suspicions were well founded. Halevy placed great 
emphasis on the part played by railway speculation. Such 
activities absorbed much needed capital. The 'dearth' of 
corn and cotton in the period 1845-1846 accelerated the 
flow of bullion from the country, and the inflexibility 
of the Act of 1844 prevented the Bank of England from 
d . d' 1 22 respon lng accor lng y. More recent studies have 
placed less emphasis upon the alleged obvious culprit, 
. l 1 t' 23 ral_way specu a lon. The impact of over speculation 
in railway investment and the cotton shortage of 1845-46 
seem to have been incidental to the problems of the money 
market in 1847. In fact, the continuing growth of the 
railway network encouraged economic growth in iron and 
steel, and absorbed labour which otherwise would have 
placed increasing strain upon poor rates. There is no 
solid evidence that other industries were starved of 
working capital. The adverse balance of payments which 
resulted from food shortages certainly led to the drain 
of gold in the early part of 1847. George Hudson, the 
"Railway King", and since 1845 M.P. for Sunderland, had 
made all these points while defending himself and his 
fellow railway directors against charges of wanton 
speculation in 1846. 24 The Bank of England was forced to 
tighten its discount policy which led to the spring 
crisis. It was the unexpected response of corn supplies 
to higher prices 
"that burst the speculative boom in wheat and touched 
off the explosive chain of bankruptcies and failures" 
in the late summer of 1847. 25 
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The Journal was dogmatic in its criticisms of the 
Act and rejected many contemporary assessments of the 
causes, stressing that the legislation of 1844 was solely 
to blame as the crisis returned in the summer: 
"None of the stock in trade of alleged causes can with 
propriety be assigned for the state of things".26 
Companies would have to borrow at ex)iorbitant rates "while 
th . k . . t . d d . . " 2 7 e currency 1s ept 1n 1 s present restr1cte con 1t1on . 
In its haste to lay responsibility for the crisis upon the 
operation of the act, the Journal swept aside the theory 
that railway speculation was primarily to blame. This. 
contrasts strongly with Greville's description of the 
trend of public opinion in 1847. In the Journal's opinion 
investment in railways had played a part in the rise of 
interest rates but such investment would not have caused 
such 
"viole~t and sudden shocks that disturbed the money 
market and frightened capitalists".28 
The evidence against the Act of i844 was overwhelming for 
no special conditions existed in the autumn of 1844 
conducive to a panic - there was an abundant harvest; 
trade was uninterrupted by wars; and industrial relations 
were stable. Trade had expanded since 1844 (although here 
the Journal seems to have admitted, unwittingly, that Peel's 
free trade strategy had worked!) and the money market 
. 29 
required an "unusually large application of money". 
The Chronicle was undecided on the part played by 
'railway mania' and the continued investment in railways. 
In May of 1847, it had called for suspension of all new 
bills in Parliament but it had opposed the termination of 
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works then in progress. The social and economic 
consequences were factors to be considered - companies 
would incur expenses without compensation and suspension 
would be less injurious to the community. Parliament had 
in fact attempted to distinguish between genuine schemes 
and those purely speculative. The Chronicle showed in its 
editorials some appreciation of the part played by railway 
construction in the economic development of the region. 
However, it welcomed the example set by the Directors 
of the Newcastle to Carlisle Railway. Their decision to 
postpone all further developments was to be applaudedfor 
"it would be well if, where practicable, such creditable 
30 
examples were followed by others". In the calmer 
atmosphere following the peak of the crisis, the Chronicle 
again warned of the dangers attached to a sudden halt to 
railway invest~ents. The Journal also was only too aware 
of the increased demands on the rates as a result of the 
consequent unemployment of the navvies. 31 
The Chronicle had always viewed the Bank Charter Act 
of 1844 in an unfavourable light32 and continued to blame 
the existing legislation for prolonging the crisis. 
"The present pressure may be in some if not a great 
degree attributable to the Act of 1844. We never 
liked this act".33 
The Chronicle again stressed the inflexibility of the 
system under which the Bank of England was forced to 
operate: 
"It must continue to tighten the screw whatever 
may be the consequences as its bullion 
increases".34 
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There was one useful result of the legislation - it had 
brought a halt to wild speculation: 
"Everyone will restrain his transactions more within 
his capital and a more healthy tone will be infused 
into trade".35 
Much of the criticism of the Chronicle was reserved 
for the directors of the Bank. While accepting that they 
were working within severe restrictions imposed by the 
legislation, it was obvious to the Chronicle that they 
had failed also to judge the demands of the money market. 
Fluctuating interest rates had aggravated the situation -
" h bl · h t d ld cannot be rl·ght". 36 sue owlng o an co The 
Chronicle looked favourably upon the suggestion that the 
government should impose a minimum or 'moderate' rate of 
discount. 
The Journal exonerated the directors of the bank 
and rebuked those who, after the crisis attempted to make 
the directors the scape~oats of the crisis. It concentrated 
its attack upon the legislation of 1844 and upon those in 
the Whig Government who stood by it. The Whig Chancellor 
had come to rely upon the financial 'expertise' of Peel 
and Peel had shown support for the Whig administration 
since his fall much to the disappointment of the younger 
l . 3 7 Pee ltes. Wood had referred to Peel on major items of 
finance and it seemed most unlikely that a major reassess-
ment of the Act would come while this relationship existed. 
The Journal called for energetic intervention by the 
government as the crisis deepened but despaired of action 
from the "drowsy chancellor" with his "do-nothing" 
determination. 38 
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"Peel's Bill is the great cause of all the mischief 
and embarrassment in the commercial world and ought 
to be repealed. Minor causes no doubt operate 
concurrently but Peel's Act is the Monster Evil".39 
The Journal, no doubt incensed by Peel's 'betrayal' over 
Corn Law Repeal, was now only too ready to view the Bank 
Charter Act as the source of all the financial problems 
of 1847. 
Greville fully supported the continued resistance 
of the Whig government to calls for interference and 
applauded its resolution in the face of mounting 
pressure. 
"My own belief is that this will prove a sound 
resolution and that they would only have aggravated 
the evil by interference". 
In stark contrast to the views expressed by the Journal 
in Newcastle, while he acknowledged that "half the 
commercial world attributes the distress and danger" to 
Peel's bill, Greville saw Wood's attitude as "stout and 
resolute from the first, and quite determined not to 
consent to any interference". 40 
The commercial community on Tyneside was convinced 
that the legislation of 1844 was the cause of most of 
the financial problems which beset them in the autumn of 
1847. Mr. Mitcalfe, a speaker at a public meeting called 
in Newcastle to consider "the present alarming state of 
the monetary and mercantile affairs of the Kingdom", 
stated that "the existing state of things is attributable 
41 to the Bank Charter Act". He considered that the 
country could not survive without a circulation of 
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£25,000,000 and that, in his opinion, "the restrictive Act 
which prevented that amount ought ... to be immediately 
suspended". He was strongly supported by all at the 
meeting, variously d~scribed as coalowners, merchants, 
manufacturers and shipowners. A petition was drawn up 
for presentation to Russell and his ministers. In the 
most uncompromising language, it drew the attention of 
the Prime Minister to 
"the injurious effect produced by the present banking 
and money laws of this country which tend to make 
~money unduly plentiful in times of adversity 
thereby producing undue fluctuation and extensive. 
evil to legitimate commercial enterprise and 
industry". 
The meeting called on Russell and Wood to "take the 
present banking enactments into consideration with a 
view to the relaxation of the same" and warned the 
government of the consequences of the legislation of 
1844: injury to imperial trade; damage to the 
mercantile, mining and manufacturing interests of the 
north of England; restriction of money for legitimate 
business and, inevitably, unemployment. 
Matthew Bell, who had assumed the chair at the 
meeting, had already written to Wood on behalf of the 
coal owners. They were much alarmed at the state of the 
money market especially as such large sums were needed 
for wages paid each fortnight. Wood's reply showed little 
sympathy for the coalowner's position. He blamed 
financial imprudence as the source of their problems. 
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"I am afraid that nothing in my power can prevent 
the consequences of over-speculation,and mistaken 
calculation in trading matters and there is nobody 
who thinks that there is any want of circulation 
or extra-ordinary pressure on the money market for 
houses in good credit". 
A meeting with Wood finally materialj.sed. Bell, 
now armed with the above petition, made several points in 
answer to Wood's criticism: trade was sound in the region; 
there had been little speculation in railways (he claimed) 
and no large scale speculation in corn in the north east; 
the area was heavily dependent on the London financial 
markets for money to pay the workforce in the iron as · 
well as the coal industry. Government intervention was 
vital if the "confusion and disturbance" which had 
occured in the financial crisis of the spring was to be 
"d d 42 avol e . 
Wood remained unmoved and had continued to point to 
the "erroneous" financial calculations of the region's 
merchants. His stance received support from the Times 
which criticised the Newcastle deputation for seeking 
simple solutions. The instant printing of money was not 
the answer to the deepening financial crisis, in the 
opinion of its editor: 
"They seem to imagine that as their own 
neighbourhood is an inexhaustible mine of coals, 
so somewhere in the south, within reach of 
Parliamentary boring and shaft sinking, there 
exists an equally inexhaustible vein of money".43 
The Times was also critical of the region's 
commercial community and saw its merchants and 
industrialists as responsible for their own problems. 
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"Sir Charles tells them a very grave truth when he 
says that their pressure arises from over speculation 
and is beyond the reach of any merely financial 
relief".44 
The deputation to Wood was also reproached from another 
quarter much closer to home. In his own uncompromising 
style, Lord Londonderry took the opportunity to attack 
the smaller collieries in the region where, in his 
opinion injurious speculation had been rife. Trade 
amongst the well established collieries was, he considered, 
most prosperous and the petition and deputation was 
unrepresentative of the views "of large proprietors on~y 
those of viewers and gentlemen who have speculated 
largely in shares in the numerous small collieries which 
have recently opened out in Northumberland and ourham". 45 
He was generous in his attitude to Peel's Bill which he 
considered "properly framed to prevent the bolstering 
f f . . . d' 1146 d h d h h' up o lCtltlous ere lt an e warne t e W lg 
Government not to give way to the clamour from the merchants 
of Newcastle - soup kitchens and relief committies would 
suffice to meet the expected social problems. 
Londonderry, however, remained in a minority of one, 
and the majority of Tyneside's coalowners and merchants 
continued to urge action on the government. Increasingly 
there were part of a steadily growing campaign, both public 
and private, which put pressure on the government to suspend 
the Bank Charter Act. 47 A similar deputation was sent from 
Liverpool calling for a temporary relaxation of the act and 
warning of the economic and social consequences if their 
pleas were ignored. E.S. Cayley, the M.P. for the North 
Riding of Yorkshire, wrote to Russell and took him to task 
for his unwillingness to face the social disaster looming: 
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"it is surely time the government should interpose 
or Parliament meet. The exemplary patience of 
the suffering classes - sufferers from faults of 
the legislature rather than their own - deserves some 
better return than a reckless reliance on a pedantic 
dogma".48 
In spite of initial differences concerning the 
provisions of the banking legislation of 1844 and its 
responsibility for the crisis of 1847, there was a 
remarkable degree of unanimity in the press of Tyneside 
when the virtual suspension of the Act was announced on 
October 25th. The Journal wrote triumphantly that 
"the incubus is thrown off; the prestige of 
inflexibility is over; the country no longer 
groans under a law that stints its currency".49 
The Whig government was still culpable of delaying 
so long in reaching this decision: 
"The suspension of Peel's Bill at the eleventh hour 
after so much loss had been incurred, so much 
suffering produced and mischief done woefully 
shows the recklessness and cruelty of their do-
nothing policy".SO 
Nor did the government's intervention go far enough 
in the opinion of the Journal. The new discount rate of 
8% was considered excessive and was an obvious means of 
carrying the extra profit' to the public account, a tactic 
characteristic of the Whigs. The relief offered was too 
meagre, too scanty and hampered with crippling conditions 
to ensure any long term financial stability. This was a 
theme taken up by the Chronicle which also welcomed the 
suspension of the act. The Government would have to take 
further measures to prevent a recurrence of such a crisis. 
The Chronicle's editorial stated emphatically that it would 
134. 
"not be sorry to see not only a virtual abandonment of that 
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measure but an actual abandonment". The Chronicle was 
not able to support the Journal over the new high rate of 
discount for it did have the virtue of restoring confidence. 
The act of 1844 was an "unnecessary'' one for it had 
attempted "to regulate that which would regulate itself if 
left alone". 52 
Both were forced onto the defensive by the comments 
of the Times. Ministerial interference with statute was 
condemned out of hand as constituting "a formal act of 
treason against the majesty of the legislature". 53 The 
Times went on to a cruel attack on those who supported and 
encouraged the government to act in such arbitary a manner 
for this might be the first of many interventions: 
"The enthusiasm with which the exhibition has been 
received might be considered to justify a repetition 
of the performances".54 
The Journal, ironically, was prepared to defend the 
Whig ministers on this point. Their action was acceptable 
"if (the Act) wanted a safety valve and would require 
the interference of the government as soon as its 
working came to be tested by any difficulties".55 
The Chronicle replied to the Times' attack in an equally 
savage way accusing it as having some stake in maintaining 
a high rate of discount and thus "to screw the utmost 
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farthing in the shape of the discount out of the needy". 
Parliament reassembled in November in order to discuss 
the urgent crisis. The Whig government expected an onslaught 
from those who, from genuine concern or, in order to take 
advantage of the situation, would attack their handling 
of the crisis. In the debate on the government's record 
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during the crisis, Wood managed to deflect criticism 
away from the Act: Peel accepted the necessity of suspension 
but continued to stress that the directors had mismanaged 
the control of credit. 57 The Whig government acceded to an 
enquiry by a Parliamentary Committee which Wood as 
Chairman stressed represented all interests and was finely 
balanced between known critics and defenders of the 
legislation of 1844. 58 The report of the committee 
acquitted both the bank and the Act. The blame for the 
crisis was laid upon certain factors: the deficiency of the 
harvests (and consequent balance of payments problems) and 
cotton supply; the diversion of capital to the railways and 
undue extensions of credit in certain areas of trade. The 
directors of the Bank of England were indirectly advised 
to recognise their public responsibilities as well as 
their private interests, but no modification of the Act 
was recommended. 59 
Even before Parliament had begun to tackle the 
question of identifying the causes and pre-conditions 
of the crisis, there was much heated debate in the press 
concerning the means by which a similar crisis could be 
avoided in the future and financial stability could be 
ensured. The Times was convinced that, by whatever means 
necessary, capital should not be swallowed up by railway 
development in the future. The higher rate of discount 
would discourage further investment but the Times reminded 
its readers that it had always attempted to persuade 
governments to take necessary action: 
"We did our best with two successive Ministries to 
induce them to apply more timely checks when millions 
of capital too hastily sunk in the earth, and now 
unavailable perhaps for some years, might have been 
saved". 60 
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The Chronicle agreed and was ready "to assent to the 
proposition that it is desirable that it (railway expenditure) 
should be brought under proper regulation in the future" 61 
although it hoped that such intervention would be unneccessary 
if the railway boards would impose their own restrictions on 
expenditiure. A too sudden halt, however, would lead to 
much "sorrow and suffering" and drastic social consequences. 
The Journal also warned of the problems that would arise 
from a rigid limitation on railway building although its 
concern was more mercenary than that of the Chronicle. 
"Neither the interests of the revenue or the peace of 
the country are at all likely to be promoted by 
hoards of unemployed "navvies" who, working or idle, 
must be fed, no matter what may be the price of the 
Exchequer Bills or the rate of interest."62 
The Times rejected the idea of "an advance on the 
national credit". This would be ''tantamount to giving up 
the principle of a_convertible currency" and would only 
lead to another chain of events which would lead to 
disaster: 
"It will only quicken speculation, aggravate 
expenditure, multiply and confirm impossible 
engagements, complicate the railway question with 
free contracts and thus bring us at no long interval 
to a still more terrible crisis".63 
Pressure had in fact mounted on the government from those 
who supported the Birmingham school of theorists, followers 
of the ideas of Thomas Attwood. He had attacked Peel's 
Bill of 1819 and the principles of convertibility upon 
64 
which it was founded. By the means of that BilL Attwood 
believed that Peel had brought about in England "more 
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misery, more poverty, more discord than A ti 11 a the Hun". 
The legislation had severely limited consumption and 
production. Attwood advocated a flexible system whereby 
the money in circulation should depend on the productive 
capacity of the country and not upon the gold stocks of 
the Bank of England. His followers took the opportunity 
in 1847 during the post-crisis debate, to lobby the Whig 
government to issue more money where required. These 
"inconvertibles" as the Times dubbed them were a "most crazy 
little squad of fanatics". 66 The Chronicle likewise was 
not won over to the arguments of the Birmingham theorists 
and was certain that: 
"The country will not agree with them; the currency 
may not be adequate to the trade of the country but 
no sane man we are confident would ever wish the 
. 
government to.enter upon such a career of recklessness 
and ruin".67 
The Chronicle hoped that a sensible rate of interest would 
deter future speculation on the scale seen since the 1844 Act 
and hoped that: 
"We shall never. again see the rate of interest so low 
as we have seen it and that the temptation may be 
removed of entering into a reckless and ruinous course 
of speculation". 6 8 
There was little support for the Government performance 
in the debates on the Commercial Crisis following the-recall 
of Parliament. The Journal was unconvinced by Wood's 
statement which shifted blame for the crisis onto the 
import of corn and the expenditure on railways. The 
Journal totally rejected Woods' hypothesis that it was the 
Bank Charter Act which had helped to prevent a crisis on 
a larger scale. The Chronicle was critical of the way in 
which Peel had continued to defend his legislation: 
"His speech indeed contained nothing to shake our 
belief that that Act was uncalled for and has done 
no good". 69 
The Journal broadened its attack on the Whig handling 
of the crisis. Certain information had been suppressed 
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concerning the state of the money market: 
"No doubt in def ere nee to foregone cone 1 us ions and to 
the prestige of Sir Robert Peel's name, the Whig 
Ministers have endeavoured to steer over as lightly 
as possibly they could the very awkward circumstances 
of the suspension and the causes that produced it".70 
In spite of the natural political prejudices the two 
leading Newcastle papers found common ground yet again over 
the composition of the Parliamentary Committee which the 
Whig government wisely decided upon to satisfy their 
critics. Wood. stressed that all interests were represented 
on the committee and that with a composition of nine known 
supporters of the act, ten critics of it and six of no 
strongly held opinion: 
"it could not be said that it was a packed committee 
or that a committee ·could be constituted which was 
more likely to form a fair and impartial judgement".71 
The Chronicle was not over sanguine concerning the likely 
verdict: 
"the committee from its composition, will decide in 
favour of the Act of 1844 and against the Directors 
of the Bank who will be made the scapegoats for 
ministerial mistakes".72 
The Journal anticipated a closing of ranks yet again in 
defence of Peel's legislation and was convinced that all 
but seven would speak on behalf of the bill: 
"The majority of 19 out of a committee of 26 places 
the result of the enquiries beyond a doubt and fully 
justified the assumption that no effectual amelionation 
of the existing system was ever contemplated by the 
government who have bound themselves hand and foot 
to the currency theories of Sir Robert Peel".73 
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CHAPTER 7 
The General Election of 1847 on Tyneside: 
Peel's Policies in Perspective 
The General Election of 1847 was a confused 
affair. 1 No one issue dominated the election as Russell 
himself admitted: 
"the absence of any party contest or of any great 
question has led to results of a very unfortunate 
character".2 
Free trade although keenly debated, was not the dominant 
issue in 1847 as envisaged by many of its advocates in 
1845. 3 In fact, religion was a far more emotive issue. 
F.R. Bonham admitted as much when commenting on the 
issues which would decide the election: "'Maynooth' has 
certainly destroyed several of our friends, 'Free Trade' 
hardly any". 4 Endowment, especially to Roman Catholics, 
proved a contentious issue in North Northumberland and 
many protectionists turned to the defence of protestantism 
as a more useful stick with which to beat their liberal 
opponents who supported free trade. Whig plans for 
education5 which would have increased the authority of 
the state and the established church, raised a storm of 
protest from non-conformist groups who took the first 
tentative steps to organise their campaign for the 1847 
e lee tion. 
The Liberal numbers were swollen to 337 in 1847 
which was a significant improvement on their showing in 
1841 (289 seats). However, this proved to be an unwieldy 
grouping containing over 100 radicals which would only 
add to Russell's problems in the House. Contemporaries 
noted a "considerable infusion of new blood'' 6 into the 
House. Many M.P's. had retired and, therefore, the 
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changes within the house led to growing fears amongst the 
Conservatives that this new House would prove to be as 
disorderly as the first Reform Parliament. Estimates of 
Peelite success vary from 80 to 120 seats. The confusion 
over the political allegiance of members arises because 
Peel refused to put himself at the head of the campaign. 
This impaired the impact of the Peelite party in the 
1 . 7 e ectlon. Greville shows that his policies and his 
presence on the political stage were still very much at 
the centre of the debates on the hustings. 8 The 
protectionists formed the major opposition with some 230-
240 seats. Contests between Protectionists and Peelites 
were rare, for Stanley had exercised a moderating influence 
over the campaign and had discouraged confrontation as 
much to avoid expenses as anything else. 9 
The election of 1847 was fought on a number of 
issues in Northumberland. Economic, religiou~ and social 
matters figure prominently in the election addresses of 
the candidates and no one issue was dominant. Although 
this was the first election held in the wake of the repeal 
of the Corn Laws, there was little emphasis on them in the 
elections. George Hudson at Sunderland, for instance, 
perhaps the region's most vocal advocate of agricultural 
protection, told his constituents he was prepared to give 
free trade a 'fair trial'. Issues such as the provision 
of education, the working of the Poor Law, or the 
retention of the Navigation Laws, played a part in the 
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campaign in the region, but it was religious issues which 
seemed to arouse most interest and the greatest feeling 
d . 10 an emotlon. Purely local matters played a greater 
part in some constituencies, for example in Tynemouth; 
but the two contested elections of North Northumberland 
and Newcastle illustrate well the diverse nature of the 
1847 election. 
Three candidates contested the division of North 
Northumberland: Lord Louvaine who veered towards 
protection, Lord Ossulton a confirmed "protectionist" 
and Sir George Grey, the unseated member in 1841 and a 
prominent Liberal Minister. It was Grey's challenge 
which drove the press to heated debate. The Journal did 
its utmost to lobby support against Sir George and rally 
electors to the cause of conservatism. Chief among its 
criticisms of the Liberal candidate was his attitude to 
Roman Catholic endowment: 
"Irish Romanism has no warmer friend at this side 
of the St. Georges' Channel".11 
His part in the framing of the new Poor Law came under 
attack and it was the Journal's considered opinion that 
his religious and political views ran counter to the 
electors of North Northumberland. 
" ... he is in direct opposition to the social worth 
and religious feeling and political intelligence 
of North Northumberland".12 
The Journal considered also that ~ir George had been 
thrust upon the electors even though his only connection 
with the area was through Earl Grey. The electors should 
be given more freedom to choose their own candidate. The 
choice in the election was quite simple: 
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"Sir George Grey and the triumph of pampered and 
endowed Romanism on the one hand - Lords Ossulton 
and Louvaine and the glorious principles of the 
British constitution on the other".13 
The Journal also warned electors to avoid the 
temptation of splitting votes in order to keep out the 
peelites for "He is no conservative who votes for Sir 
George Grey". 14 Sir George, the Journal stated, stood 
for everything opposed by the electors of the North 
Northumberland constituency - Roman Catholic endowment, 
opposition to protection and support of the new poor 
;-
law, and all should oppose them: 
" ... who value our mixed constitution and prize its 
inestimable privileges who see in it the only 
safeguards of religious freedom,and dread the 
access of that daring and restless spirit of 
innovation which holds nothing sacred and 
continually pants after wild and sweeping 
changes".lS 
The Whigs and their new fangled doctrines had already 
made significant changes and it was to be feared that 
"daring inroads may be made upon our most cherished 
• • • 11 16 1nst1tut1ons . 
Sir George Grey defended his decision to vote for 
repeal of the Corn Laws and he rejected the accusation 
that by doing this he would help to bring ruin to the 
agricultural community for as owner of 900 acres, he 
would ruin himself in the process. He stood for 
"protection", but his form of protection differed greatly 
from the artificial one imposed by parliament: 
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"I am for protection to agriculture - not that which 
is dead and gone: not that which led people to 
believe that parliament could fix remunerative 
prices for the produce of the land; true protection 
consists in an enlightened and judicious co-operation 
on the part of the landlords and the tenants to 
increase the ~roductiveness of the soil".l7 
He recommended the granting of long leases as proper 
security of tenure for tenants and the provision of "fair 
and liberal" aid which would enable the "english farmer to 
compete successfully with farmers of any nation on earth". 18 
Sir George Grey's views were much in line with 
Peel's statement of conservative principles in the 
Tamworth Manifesto of 1834. Peel had warned that as 
Prime Minister he would not bend to every popular whim 
for reform and thereby abandon respect for ancient rights 
and authority. However, Peel accepted the need for change 
and improvement where there existed a strong case. 
Sir George likewise endorsed these views when he 
espoused the adoption of a more "enlightened" approach 
to the problem of "protection" for agriculture. In 1847 
Peel reiterated some of these views in his letter to 
his constituents, emphasizing the conservative nature 
of Corn Law repeal, and in 1849 followed the emphasis 
that Grey had used in Northumberland in 1847, when he 
advocated ''high farming" as an alternative to protection. 19 
Thus the Liberal Sir George Grey seemed the closest north-
eastern advocate of the new principle adopted by the 
erstwhile Tory Prime Minister. 
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It is significant that Grey felt that he must defend 
himself on the question of protection to agriculture and 
his election address did not contain a statement on his 
attitude to religious or social questions although these 
were the main areas of attack chosen by the right wing 
press. Perhaps he felt that electors in North Northumberland 
were more concerned about their own livelihood than the 
principles at stake in Catholic endowment or the 
condition of the workhouses. 
Grey's fellow candidates in the election were 
prepared to accommodate some of the arguments in favour 
of free trade although both assured the electors that they 
had the best interests of the agricultural community at 
heart and would spring to its defence if benefits did not 
flow from the "great experiment" in tariff reform. Lord 
Louvaine retained the same confidence in the English 
farmer as Sir George Grey and he considered that the 
farmers' "talent and energy" would enable them to meet 
the new challenge. However, Louvaine would not compromise 
over the Navigation Acts. He opposed completely any 
alteration to these laws, " ... the origin of the enormous 
commercial prosperity of this Kingdom" 20 Lord Ossulton 
felt compelled to defend his own record in parliament. 
He resented the charge that he had neglected his duties 
and that he was a mere party and family nominee and he 
promised to support measures for the future protection 
of agriculture and native industry if free trade proved 
detrimental to these interests. 
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The victory of Sir George Grey in the election was 
received stoically by the Journal: "The good cause has 
21 
received a severe, but we trust only a temporary defeat". 
The electors had been lured away by the fallacies of free 
trade; but the full effects of the abolition of tariff were 
not yet appreciated and thus there was hope that the 
voters would return to the only party which protected 
national interests: 
"men will again learn to appreciate the safe policy 
of true conservatism and will see through the flimsy 
sophistries that now catch and attract them".22 
Finally, the Whig government "had not yet opportunity 
for claiming itself in the eyes of the country" 23 and 
they would prove to be unsuitable for office during a 
full parliament. The treachery of Sir Robert Peel and the 
"confusing of party ties and political distinctions" 
occasioned by Peel's action had also created a temporary 
diversion for ~he electorate. 
Grey's victory was applauded by the liberal press 
although only the Newcastle Guardian considered free 
trade and Grey's espousal of it to have been a factor 
explaining his success. The Guardian considered that 
the results in Middlesex and North Northumberland were: 
"convincing evidence of the rapid ebb in public 
opinion of the dogmas of Protection".24 
Both Chronicle and Guardian saw·Grey's victory iB 1847 
as just revenge for the defeat of the family in 1841 by 
. 25 
a "combined phalanx of monopolists and their dependents". 
Fear of foreign competition had, presumably, driven the 
gentry to vote against a "liberal and enlightened 
nobleman". Commonsense had at last prevailed although 
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the Chronicle had never underestimated the strength of 
the powerful coalition cited above. 
"The coalition of 1841 still exists, although some 
of the parties to it may be changed ... (however) 
it is perfectly clear that the determination to 
monopolise the representation of the division and 
make us the slaves of lordly domination is as 
strong and as rampant as ever".26 
Grey had "boldly undertook the glorious task of 
freeing North Northumberland from slavery" 27 and he had 
succeeded in rescuing the constituency from becoming 
little better than a mere "nomination borough". The 
electors had expunged the bitter memory of the defeat·of 
the Grey family in 1841 at the hands of the nobility and 
they had proved that "they were not the servile tools they 
(the aristocracy) took them for". Grey had taken on 
the landed interests and won. 28 
" ... the champion of our independence who has at 
great personal sacrifice and at our request most 
nobly come forward to rescue the representation 
of the country from aristocratic usurpation".29 
It was Grey's personal qualities, recognised even by 
the Journal as well, that were seen as the reason for his 
victories. Policies are not stressed by the Chronicle. 
Grey was a man of high character and acknowledged talents 
and he was to be commended for the "Chivalrous Spirit" 
he had shown in abandoning a certain seat in Devonport 
for the "toil and hazard" of the contest in North 
Northumberland even though he held an important 
ministerial post. By electing sir George, the voters 
had rejected an attempt at dictation by the aristocracy. 
Northumberland electors had a mind of their own and they 
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"will not suffer the representation of Northumberland 
to become the property of any family or coalition 
of families however powerful".30 
The Journal's political lobbying wasno more 
successful in the Newcastle election. Here Ord, a 
sitting candidate for 12 years and a liberal was joined 
by two other candidates Hodgson, the protectionist and 
Thomas Headlam another liberal both of whom were fighting, 
realistically, for the seat vacated by the retiring 
incumbent Hinde. The Journal, of course, espoused the 
cause of Hodgson who was an out and out anti-Peelite 
and opposed the commercial and financial policies of the 
former Tory Prime Minister. Hodgson was also a strong 
critic of the "harsh and obnoxious clauses of the Poor 
Law" 31 and thus he would surely carry the day against 
Headlam and would thus join Ord as the second member for 
the constituency. Ord was in fact an outspoken supporter 
of Peel's policies and he gave a detailed analysis of 
the virtues of the commercial policies of the late Tory 
administration - consumption from abroad had increased; 
taxes had been reduced by £7m; revenue was static and 
vital imports of corn had been secured during the period 
of famine and distress. For Ord, this election was very 
much about economic matters and especially free trade 
and he promised opposition in parliament to any party, 
"who have recourse to the exploded principles 
of protection ... and which work infinite mischief 
and hardship upon the rest of the community".32 
Headlam compromised and took a middle road between 
the other candidates and presumably tried to appeal to 
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as wide a spectrum of the political electorate as was 
possible. He skirted around the key issues of the 
Navigation Acts and Catholic endowment but promised that, 
if elected, he would put the maritime interests of 
Newcastle first. He stressed that he was a true friend 
to religious liberty and therefore no man should suffer 
any civil, financial, or religious deprivation for his 
views. Headlam's "canny" approach proved successful and 
he joined Ord in Parliament. 33 Peelites and Whigs carried 
the day. 
The Newcastle Guardian saw the victory of Headlam 
and the defeat of Hodgson as very significant in political 
terms: 
"A new party is arising in the state which 
rejecting the old names and watchwords of 
faction is desirous to overthrow the system of 
class legislation and carry the work of social 
and political reform".34 
The victory of the Liberal candidate was further 
proof of the political preferences of Newcastle in the 
view of the Guardian namely, opposition to protection and 
the "monstrous scheme of universal religious endowments"; 
and support for the extension of the franchise and 
social reform. 35 
Peel's economic measures and the debate over free 
trade seemed to play a far more prominent part in the 
election addresses made by the two unopposed candidates 
in South Northumberland. The 'protectionist' Matthew 
Bell, obviously reeling under what he felt to be the 
tide in favour of free trade,was at great pains to state 
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his hope that he would be proved wrong and such a policy 
would eventually prove beneficial: 
"no one will rejoice more to find this apprehension 
unfounded".36 
He assured the electors that his opposition to Peel whom 
he took to be sincere in his actions was based on his 
concern for the true interests of the country and he would 
not withhold his support from any government for factious 
reasons. Therefore, he would support the Whig Education 
Bill and the extension of the Poor Law to Ireland but he 
held firm over the sanctityof the Navigation Acts "under 
which our commercial marine has grown and flourished for 
37 20 years". Any alteration "would endanger our commercial 
marine". 
Saville Ogle, a liberal, reminded the electors that 
I 
in his six years' absence, he and the Whigs had consistently 
supported Peel and without their support in Parliament 
the progress made towards free trade would have been 
impossible. They had put country before party. Ogle 
fully supported Peel's view that conditions now favoured 
the British farmer. Demand was increasing owing to 
population growth and therefore the farmers need not 
suffer if they were prepared to meet the new challenge 
energetically. Furthermore, espousing the next logical 
step on the path to free trade, he considered that the 
Navigation Acts needed examination and alteration. 
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Although local matters (i.e. the granting to North 
Shields of equal commercial status with Newcastle) 
dominated the Tynemouth election, the Navigation Acts 
and Peel's commercral policy were still important issues. 
Sir Ralph Grey a Liberal who had done much to sponsor 
the extension of customs house facilities to the borough, 
stated that he supported the movement towards readjustment 
of the Navigation Acts which had remained intact for so 
long. However, he recognised the importance to North 
Shi~lds of such a system of protection and the supply 
of seamen that these laws provided and he would endeavour 
to protect the interests of the borough. He was, 
unashamedly, a supporter of Sir Robert Peel's commercial 
policies and would vote for the extension of education 
b d . th 1 d 1 . . t h . 3 8 unencum ere w1 _ mora an re 1g1ous eac 1ng. 
Viewing results nationally, the Newcastle Guardian 
was far more ecstatic concerning the final results than 
either the Chronicle or the Journal. The Guardian 
considered that there had been a net liberal gain of 
43 M ._P' s. and this was due to the progress of "reform" 
principles among the "constituent body of the empire" 39 
The Chronicle did not consider that issues arising from 
the previous parliament had made the election of 1847 
dramatically different from that of 184~. 
"The elections ... have proceeded in much the same way 
and shown much the same feeling as those which 
preceded them. They are not calculated to make 
much difference to the strength of the parties".40 
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The importance of the repeal of the corn laws as well 
as private quarrels were seen as determining factors in 
many county results where electors may have rejected a 
former M.P. on the strength of his attitude towards 
Protection. In the eyes of the Chronicle, elections had 
been fought in 1847 without the usual party sting and 
competition. The reason put forward was that the Tories 
had lost a cause - Protection - and were prepared to wait 
upon the judgement of public opinion on repeal. It seemed 
that the Tories had decided "to give the new state of 
affairs a fair trial". 41 The vacillations of Bell, a 
former Protectionist, would seem to bear this out. 
The absence of party conflict may well have been 
due to the general confusion of party groupings, the 
variety of issues and Stanley's moderating influence as 
noted above. As the Chronicle observed: 
"The elections for the most part have evinced 
little of the old party spirit. Neither of the 
parties have fairly engaged in open conflict".42 
The fact that out of 401 constituencies, 236 were not 
contested also goes a long way to explain why there was 
II 1 f 11 • II 43 an unusua absence o a party cr1es . 
Conservative fears that the new House would be an 
unruly place filled as it was with so many new M.P's. 
were reflected in the Journal's opinion of the new 
parliament. It doubted whether Peel or Russell could 
make much of the 
"mass of ignorant presumption, political inexperience 
and personal obscurity ... a more motley incongruous 
or ill-assorted mob of legislators ... have never 
been found congregated in the British Parliament".44 
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Russell echoed the Journal's views. Writing to his 
Sovereign on the state of parties following the election, 
he doubted whether he "or any other Minister will have 
h d f l t • • 11 45 t e comman o a regu ar par y ma]or1ty . He was 
more optimistic however, than the Journal for, in all 
probability, 
"the Government will be sufficiently strong to 
resist both the reaction against free trade and 
any democratic movement against the Church or 
the aristocracy".45 
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op.cit., p.488. Dissenting support for Russell 
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CONCLUSION 
Press reaction in the North East of England to the 
economic legislation of Peel's administration 1841-1846 
was above all parochial. The editors saw their measures in 
162. 
north-eastern terms and were less concerned about the national 
impact. There .was a general acceptance of his tariff 
proposals except where these measures affected a vital north-
east interest i.e. coal. Peel's attempts to raise revenue 
I 
from a reintroduction of the export duty on coal raised 
a storm of protest throughout the region. By 1845 there 
seemed agreement throughout the press that Peel's strategy 
had proved to be beneficial. His decision to abolish the 
export tax on coal was, of course, warmly received 
throughout the area. 
Reaction within the press was, of course, also conditioned 
by the political stance of the proprietors, editors and 
reading public. The Journal,as the leading Tory paper, 
defended Peel's economic legislation even when it ran counter 
to northern interests. The importance of the political 
allegiance of the paper was the determining factor when 
considering the Journal's attitude to Peel during and after 
1846. His 'betrayal' of the party in 1846 led to a 
reappraisal of the Tory leader and even his economic 
legislation. By 1847, the Journal had in fact come to 
oppose the operation of the Bank Charter Act of 1844 and 
it was only too ready to blame Peel's banking and currency 
reforms for the crises of the spring and summer of that year. 
The bulk of his party had come to regard Peel as a pariah 
and the Journal's comments during and after the Repeal 
crisis echo the line taken by the conservative protectionists 
in parliament. 
The Radical and Liberal press on Tyneside remained 
somewhat suspicious of Peel and his economic policies 
throughout the period under review. The Radical papers 
(Tyne Mercury and Gateshead Observer) were, in general, 
more sympathetic to Peel's objectives than the Liberal 
Chronicle which remained unconvinced throughout the 1840's. 
The reciprocal admiration professed by the Tory Peel and 
the Radical Cobden contrasts equally with the condemnation 
of Peel by the Liberal ex-Premier, Lord Melbourne. In 
their approach to, for instance, factory reform or Poor 
Law reform, some Radicals had always found some Tories 
more congenial than most Liberals. If the Journal reacted 
sharply to Peel's monumental decision to go for repeal 
of the corn laws in 1846, there were no corresponding 
plaudits from the Chronicle and Tyne Mercury even though 
these papers had called continually for more sweeping 
measures in regard to corn. 
The reaction in the north-east press is broadly 
reflected by the regions M.P's. Their comments represent 
the local concerns of their constituents. When the 
future of the coal industry was at stake, _the leading 
sector of the region's industrial development, Northern 
M.P's. of all parties were stirred into action. Otherwise, 
M.P's. north of the Tyne had little to contribute in 
parliament on the great questions of the day and their 
comments in general represent the political line taken 
by their respective parties. 
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By 1847, economic policies, except for the Bank 
Charter Act, had produced only a limited impact in the 
north-east. The election of 1847,north of the Tyn~raised 
the issue of free trade but much of the economic package 
delivered by the government of Peel was now accepted, 
even the repeal of the corn laws. Results in the region 
proved that it would be unwise to campaign on a strong 
protectionist ticket. Debate over economic policies had 
moved on to a consideration of the future of the 
Navigation Acts which, like the coal industry, was of 
major regional concern. The issues which raised most 
emotion were the perennial ones which dominated the 
mid-Victorian political stage - religion (especially 
clerical endowment) and social policy (the provision for 
the poor). 
164. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A. PRIMARY SOURCES 
I. Manuscript Sources 
II. 
1. 
Minute Book of the United Committee of the Coal Trade, 
Northumberland County Record Office. 
Printed 
Newspapers 
The Gates head Observer 
The Newcastle Chronicle 
The Newcastle Guardian 
The Newcastle Journal 
The Standard 
The Times 
The Tyne Mercury 
The Sunderland Herald 
2. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, 1832-1847. 
3. Contemporary Writings 
Broughton, .Lord., Recollections of a Long Life, 
ed. Lady Dorchester, Vol. VI (London, 1911). 
Greville, Charles, The Greville Memoirs 1814-1860, 
ed. L. Strachey and R. Fulford, Vol. V. (London, 1938). 
Peel, Sir Robert, Sir Robert Peel from his Private 
Papers, ed. C.S. Parker, Vols II and III (London, 1899). 
Queen Victoria, The Letters of Queen Victoria 1837-1861, 
ed. Benson and Esher, Vol. II (London, 1908). 
165. 
B. SECONDARY SOURCES 
Baldwin, C.E .. , The History and Development of the Port 
of Blyth (Newcastle, 1929). 
Blake, R., The Conservative Party from Peel to 
Churchill (London, 1979). 
Bourke, P., 'The Scientific Investigation of the Potato 
Blight', Irish Historical Studies, Vol. XII (1962) 
pp. 2 6-3 2. 
Boyd-Hilton, Cash, Corn, Commerce: The Economic Policies 
of the Tory Governments 1815-1830. (Oxford, 1980). 
Boyd-Hilton, 'Peel: A Reappraisal', Historical Journal, 
Vol. XXII, No. 3 (Sept. 1979), pp. 585-614. 
Briggs, A., 'Thomas Attwood and the Economic Background 
to the Birmingham Political Union', Cambridge Historical 
Journal, Vol. IX, No. 2 (1948), pp. 190-216. 
Brown, L., The Board of Trade and the Free Trade 
Movement 1830-1842. (Oxford, 1958). 
Cameron, R.H., 'The Melbourne Administration, the 
Liberals and the Crisis of 1841', Durham University 
Journal, Vol. XXXVIII. (Dec. 1976), pp. 83-103. 
Challinor R. and Ripley B., The Miners Association: 
A Trade Union in the Age of the Chartists (London, 1968). 
Connacher, J.B., The Peelites and the Party System 
1846-1852. (Newton Abbott, 1972). 
Connacher, J.B., 'Peel and the Peelites 1846-1850', 
English Historical review, Vol. 73 (1958), pp. 431-446. 
Cooter, R.J., 'On Calculating the 19th Century Irish 
Catholic Population of Durham and Newcastle', 
Northern Catholic History, Vol. 2 (1975), pp. 16-25. 
Fisher, D.R., 'Peel and the Conservative Party: The 
Sugar Crisis of 1844 Reconsidered', Historical Journal, 
Vol. XVIII, No. 2. (1975), pp. 279-302. 
Fisher, J.R., 'Issues and Influence: Two By-Elect~ons 
in South Nottinghamshire in the Mi~-19th Century'. 
Historical Journal, Vol. XXXIV (1981), pp. 155-166. 
Fisher, J.R., 'The Limits of Deference: Agricultural 
Communities in the Mid-19th Century Election Campaign', 
Journal of British Studies, Vol. XXI (1981), pp. 90-105. 
Gash, N., Sir Robert Peel, (London, 1972). 
166. 
Gash, N., Aristocracy and People: Britain 1815-1865, 
(London, 1979). 
Gayer, A.D. Rostow W.W. and Schwartz, A.J., The Growth 
and Fluctuation o£ the British Economy 1790-1850, 
(Oxford, 1953). 
Halevy, E., The Age of Peel and Cobden, (London, 1947). 
Heesom, A.J., 'Two Perennial Groups Labelled Whig and 
Tory: Parties and Party Leaders in early Victorian 
England', Durham University Journal (1973), pp. 81-92. 
Heesom, A.J., 'The Sunderland By-Election, Sept. 1841', 
Northerri History, IX (1974), pp. 62-78. 
Heesom, A. J., 'The Northern Coal Owners and the 
Opposition to the Coal Mines Act of 1842', International 
Review of Social History, XXV (1980), pp. 236-271. 
Hiskey, C.E., 'The Third Marquess of Londonderry and 
the Regulation of the Coal Trade: The Case Re-opened! 
Durham University Journal, new series, XLIV (June 1983) 
i??. 1-19. 
Jaggard, E., 'The 1841 General Election: A 
Reconsideration' Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, Vol. XXX (1984), pp. 99-114. 
Jordan, H.D., 'The Political Methods of the Anti-Corn 
Law League' Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XLIII, 
( 19 2 7) ' pp. 58-7 6 . 
Kemp, B., 'Patriotism, Pledges and the People' ed. 
M. Gilbert, A Century of Conflict 1850-1950: Essays 
for A.J.P. Taylor (London, 1966). 
Kemp, B., 'The General Election of 1841', History, 
Vol. XXVII (1952), pp. 146-157. 
Large, D., 'The Third Marquess of Londonderry and the 
End of Regulation 1844-1845', Durham University Journal, 
new series, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Dec. 1958), pp. 1-9. 
Large, D., 'The Election of John Bright as a member 
for Durham City in 1843', Durham University Journal, 
( 19 54) ' pp. 17-2 3. 
Martin, E., Bedlington Iron and ~ngine Works 1736-1867. 
(Newcastle, 1974). 
Martin, S.B., Sleekburn: The Station (Newcastle, 1986). 
167. 
McDermott, T.P., 'Irish Workers on Tyneside in the 19th 
Century', Essays in Tyneside Labour History. ed. 
N. McCord (Newcastle, ·1977), pp. 154-178. 
McCord, N., The Anti-Corn Law League, (London, 1958). 
McCord, N., North East England: The Region's Development 
1760-1960, (London, 1979). 
Milne, M., 'The Tyne Mercury and Parliamentary Reform', 
Northern History, XIV (1978), pp. 227-242. 
Moore, D.C., 'The Corn Laws and High Farming', 
Economic History Review, 2nd Series, Vol. XVIII (1965-
1966)' pp. 544-561. 
Newbould, I.D., 'Sir Robert Peel and the Conservative 
Party, 1832-1841: A Study in Failure' English Historical 
Review, XLIII (July, 1983), pp. 529-558. 
Nossiter, T.J., Influence, Opinion and Political Idioms 
in Reformed England, Case Studies from the North East: 
1832-1874. (Hassocks, 1975). 
Prest, J., Lord John Russell, (London, 1972). 
Prest, J., Politics in the Age of Cobden, (London, 1977). 
Rice, C.D., 'Humanity sold for Sugar: The British 
Abolitionist Response to Free Trade in Slave Grown 
Sugar' Historical Journal, Vol. XIII (1970), pp. 402-418. 
Rowe, D., 'Population in 19th Century Tyneside' in 
N. McCord (ed.) Essays in Tyneside Labour History 
(Newcastle, 1977). 
Rowe, D., 'The Economy of the North-East in the 19th 
Century', Northern History, Vol. III (1971), pp. 117-147. 
Rowe, D., 'The Decline of the Tyneside Keelmen in the 
19th Century', Northern History Vol. IV (1979), 
pp . 111-131 . 
Rowe, D., 'Tyneside Chartism' in N. McCord (ed), 
Essays in Tyneside Labour History (Newcastle, 1977), 
pp. 62-87 0 
Southgate, D., The Passing of the Whigs, (London, 1962). 
Spiers, E.M., Radical General: Sir George de Lacy Evans 
1787-1870, (Manchester, 1983). 
Spring, D., 'The Earls of Durham and the Great Northern 
Coalfield, 1830-1880', Canadian Historical Review, 
Vol. XXXIII (1952), pp. 244-253. 
168. 
Stewart, R., 'The Ten Hours and Sugar Crisis of 1844', 
Historical Journal, Vol. XII, No. 1 (1969), pp. 35-57. 
Stewart, R., The Politics of Protection: Lord Derby 
and the Protectionist Party 1841-1852, (Cambridge, 1971). 
Tancred, M.L., 'The Anti-League', Historical Journal, 
Vol. III (1960), pp. 162-183. 
Ward-Perkins, C.N., 'The Commercial Crisis of 1847' 
Oxford Economic Papers', No. 2. (1950), pp. 75-94. 
Woodham-Smith, C.,· The Great Hunger, (London, 1979). 
Zeigler, P., Lord Melbourne, (London, 1976). 
169. 
